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I. INTRODUCTION

Car crashes kill more teens each year than any other cause;1
and of the crashes in which they are involved, teens are
overwhelmingly at fault. 2 Decades of law reform efforts have led
to mandatory seatbelt laws, an increased legal drinking age, and
graduated-driver-licensing systems. 3 Yet traffic fatalities, which
have held steady for nearly a decade, account for nearly 40% of all
deaths of sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds. 4 Adopting sixteen as the
presumptive age of licensure has made the United States the
earliest-licensing nation in the developed world. 5 U.S. teens
acquire licenses to drive at younger ages and with less experience
than do young people in other nations. They also have a greater
risk of being injured or killed in a car crash than do their
1 The next three leading causes of teen death-homicides, suicides, and cancer-related
illness-trail only distantly. Fatality Facts 2012: Teenagers, INS. INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY,
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/teenagers/fatalityfacts/teenagers/2012 (last visited June 1,
2014). In 2010, 3,115 thirteen- to nineteen-year-olds died in motor-vehicle crashes, 1,927
died as a result of homicides, 1,863 as a result of suicides, and 792 from malignant
neoplasms, or cancers. Id.; see also Dara R. Blachman & David Abrams, Behavioral and
Social Science Contributions to Preventing Teen Motor Crashes: Systems Integrative and
InterdisciplinaryApproaches, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S285, S285 (Supp. 2008) ("Motorvehicle crashes are the leading preventable cause of death for U.S. teenagers ...").
2 Studies have found young drivers to be at fault in 75% to 80% of the car crashes in
which they are involved. See Keli A. Braitman et al., Crashes of Novice Teenage Drivers:
Characteristicsand Contributing Factors, 39 J. SAFETY RES. 47, 52 (2008) (finding that
three-fourths of the teenagers studied were at fault); Bridie Scott-Parker et al., "They're
Lunatics on the Road" Exploring the Normative Influences of Parents, Friends, and Police
on Young Novices' Risky Driving Decisions, 50 SAFETY SCI. 1917, 1917 (2012) (noting that
nearly eight out of ten novice drivers in Queensland, Australia were found at fault in the
car accidents in which they were involved from 1998 to 2008).
3 See infra Part II.A. Graduated licensing requires beginning drivers to obtain first a
learner's permit allowing only supervised driving for a specified period, then a provisional
license allowing unsupervised driving subject to restrictions, and lastly, full licensure. See
infra Part II.B.3.
4 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., PREVENTING TEEN MOTOR CRASHES: CONTRIBUTIONS
FROM THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, WORKSHOP REPORT 7 (2007).
5

See Patricia F. Waller et al., Changes in Young Adult Offense and Crash Patterns Over

Time, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 117, 118 (2001) ("In industrialized nations

other than the US, driver licensure does not ordinarily occur until age 17 or 18."). Six
states license prior to age sixteen (Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and South Carolina); the majority of states-thirty-seven-allow learner's permits
prior to age sixteen, but not licenses; nine states allow learner's permits only at age sixteen
(Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.). Allan F. Williams & Julie Tison, Motor Vehicle
Fatal Crash Profiles of 13-15- Year-Olds, 43 J. SAFETY RES. 145, 146 (2012).
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counterparts in other developed nations. 6
Driving, then, is
arguably thegreatest public health threat facing U.S. teens.7
This Article draws on principles of social ecology to explain
adolescent driving as a public health issue comprising complex
adolescent-environment interactions.8 This explanation interrelates
research from the social and developmental sciences (public health;
traffic safety; applied, behavioral, cognitive, developmental, and
social psychology; and developmental neuroscience).
It also
accounts for existing regulatory structures and, with an eye towards
potential reform, considers political challenges, constitutional
boundaries, and the basic obligations of the liberal democratic state
to its immature citizens.
Despite the tremendous costs to public health imposed by
adolescent driving, and the wide range of legal and policy issues
implicated, neither legal academics working in the area of public
health law nor those working in adolescent rights have focused
attention on adolescent licensure. 9 While our academic inattention
might be explained, it can no longer be justified nor excused. 10
6 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. Although the risk of crash-related
injury and death is lower in countries including Australia, Canada, and the nations of the
European Union (E.U.) than in the United States, crashes are the leading cause of teen
death and injury in these countries as well. Melanie J. White et al., Young Drivers'
Optimism Bias for Accident Risk and Driving Skill: Accountability and Insight Experience
Manipulations, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1309, 1309 (2011).
7 See Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 47 (discussing elevated crash rates for teen
drivers); Jean T. Shope & C. Raymond Bingham, Teen Driving: Motor-Vehicle Crashes and
Factors That Contribute, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S261, S263 (2008) (similar); WORLD
HEALTH ORG., YOUTH AND ROAD SAFETY 2-3 (Tami Toroyan & Margie Peden eds., 2007),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2007/9241595116_eng.pdf?ua=l (noting
that road traffic injuries are also the leading cause of death for teens worldwide).
8 See Carol W. Runyan & Michael Yonas, Conceptual Frameworks for Developing and
ComparingApproaches to Improve Adolescent Motor-Vehicle Safety, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE
MED. S336, S336-38 (Supp. 2008) (describing the social-ecological framework and applying
it to teen driving).
9 Legal academics have tended to focus attention on rights extended to young people in
other regulatory contexts, such as abortion, medical decisionmaking, and juvenile justice.
This work has in recent years begun to consider various law and policy implications of
research in child and adolescent development. This research has perhaps received most
attention in the juvenile justice context, in which questions of socio-emotional control and
decisionmaking capacity are central. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG,
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 160-65 (2008) (discussing the MacArthur Juvenile
Adjudicative Study, a large-scale study designed to compare the specific capacities of juveniles
and adults that are directly implicated in assessing adjudicative competence); Catherine J.
Ross, A Stable Paradigm: Revisiting Capacity, Vulnerability and the Rights Claims of
Adolescents after Roper v. Simmons, in LAW. MIND & BRAIN 183. 184-87 (Michael Freeman &
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Law reform efforts to date have had limited success not only
because they have only imperfectly taken account of extant
research, but also because they have been politically tentative,
scattered, and piecemeal. To effectively address this critical public
health issue, regulatory structures would take account of the
accumulated contributions from this research and analyze its
policy implications. This Article does so and argues for the most
effectual legal reforms and extralegal interventions to which this
examination inexorably points.
To that end, it proceeds in three parts. Part II places the issue
of adolescent licensure and driving in social, legal, and cultural
context. It first surveys the nature and public health implications
of teen crashes, particularly the disproportionate number of
crashes caused by adolescent drivers aged sixteen to seventeen. It
then traces the evolution of state licensure regulation and assesses
Finally, it describes how
the current regulatory landscape.
adolescent licensure and driving convey cultural meanings and
perform social functions wholly apart from any utilitarian
transportation function.
Insights from learning theory and adolescent development help
explain the observed characteristics of adolescent driving and the

Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) (discussing the impact of MRI research on the Court's
decision in Roper v. Simmons holding that the death penalty cannot constitutionally be
applied to crimes committed when the defendant was a minor). The trend has become
sufficiently strong that legal commentators and researchers alike have cautioned against
improvident or premature use of the still-developing scientific literature in policymaking. See,
e.g., Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2009) (arguing against a narrow focus on capacity
and developmental "facts" in favor of a broader assessment of developmental "effects" when
determining how developmental differences should shape children's rights); Terry A. Maroney,
The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice,85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89,
89 (2009) (warning that both relevant legal doctrine and shortcomings inherent to the science
itself limit the applicability of developmental neuroscience to juvenile justice issues); Stephen
J. Morse, Lost in Translation?: An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 529, 562 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010) ("Neuroscience has the potential to
make internal contributions to legal doctrine and practice if the relation is properly
understood. For now, however, such contributions are modest at best.... ');Laurence
Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 747 (2009) (noting a number of limiting factors when using neuroscience
to inform public policy).
10 Abortion, for example, implicates constitutionally protected intimate choices and
involves a hotly debated moral issue; driving does not (although undoubtedly some
adolescents seem to view driving with near-religious reverence and fervor).
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contextual influences that affect it, for better and for worse. Part
III surveys this cross-disciplinary research, laying the empirical
foundations for the recommendations made in Part IV.
It
examines research that aims to distinguish the developmentrelated causes of adolescent crash risk (which are normative and
not susceptible to change through external interventions) from
experience-related causes (which are amenable to interventionsspecifically, education and driving practice).
In light of the state's basic obligations to its immature citizens,
Part IV argues that states ought to adopt the only regulatory
adjustment capable of effectively eliminating the leading cause of
adolescent death-raising the minimum unsupervised driving age.
At the same time, it suggests retaining or lowering the age of
learner's licensure (the age at which adolescents may drive under
adult supervision). It then provides a set of interventions short of
raising the age of licensure that would still provide some benefit.
Finally, it anticipates and aims to meet political and legal
objections.
II. ADOLESCENT DRIVING

Adolescent driving is a complex social and public health issue.
Principles of social ecology aim to explain complex personenvironment interactions by identifying and taking account of the
interrelationships between personal, -social, cultural, and
institutional contexts that form the environment in which persons
live.11 Because socio-ecological models examine multiple levels
and sources of influence on behavior, they can also help identify
multiple levels of interventions. 12 Multilevel interventions can be
particularly effective in changing behavior, especially in the public
health context. 13
I draw on a socio-ecologic framework to characterize adolescent
driving and then to propose legal reform and other interventions
most likely to be effective. The framework conceptualizes public

11 See generally Lindsay McLaren & Penelope Hawe, Ecological Perspectives in Health
Research, 59 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 6 (2005) (outlining the elements of an
ecological approach to public health issues).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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health problems as resulting from multiple interacting factors that
operate at four broadly defined levels to influence behavior: First,
the intrapersonal level involves individual characteristicsjudgment, decisionmaking processes, self-regulatory capacities
(such as managing distractions), knowledge of driving rules and
14
maneuvering skills, and perception of and reaction to risk.
Second, the interpersonallevel involves interactions with otherse.g., peer and parental relationships. 1 5 Third, the institutional
level comprises those institutions and organizations that influence
an individual, such as schools or churches. 16
Finally, the
sociocultural level incorporates both broad social norms as well as
7
laws and the mechanisms of their enforcement.
This Part first describes the public health dimensions of
adolescent driving. Empirical data reveal the nature and scope of
the risk that young drivers pose to themselves, their passengers,
and all who share the roadways with them. 8 Comprehensive
data-gathering has only in recent decades provided reliable
statistical evidence of teen crashes and crash-related fatalities, yet
long before such data became available, the fact that teen drivers
pose heightened crash risk was widely recognized. 19 A 1909 article
published in a popular magazine, for example, observed that "the
great problem of the automobile is recklessness, . . . especially in
the young, who are to such a great degree attracted by the
20
pleasures of motoring."
To mitigate the dangers posed by immature drivers, states
21
imposed minimum age and other requirements for licensure.
This Part next chronicles the evolution of relevant aspects of state
licensing and regulatory structures, and analyzes their relative
successes and failures.
Runyan & Yonas, supranote 8, at S337.
Id.
16 Id. at S337-38.
17 Id. at S338.
18 See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
19 See J.A. Groeger, Youthfulness, Inexperience, and Sleep Loss: The Problems Young
Drivers Face and Those They Pose for Us, 12 INJ. PREVENTION, at i19, i19 (Supp. I 2006)
("[T]he 'young driver problem' has been with us, in whichever country we live, for as long as
substantial numbers of those in their teens have driven motor vehicles.").
20 T.O. Abbott, The Lawmaker and the Automobile: Uniformity of Laws Desirable, 54
OUTING MAG. 613, 618 (1909).
21 See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
14
15
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Driving is culturally significant, and it serves social functions
wholly unrelated to transportation. 22 This Part concludes with an
examination of the socio-cultural meanings and functions of driving
and their particular salience for adolescents. It thus provides a
fuller understanding of adolescent licensure and brings into sharper
focus what may be lost if states further constrict or withdraw from
adolescents altogether the entitlement to early licensure.
A brief definition of terms is in order: "teen" here will denote a
category of individuals defined by chronological age-those
thirteen to nineteen; "adolescence" will denote a category defined
by developmental stage-that between childhood and adulthood,
generally spanning ages twelve to seventeen; 23 and "emerging
adulthood" will denote the developmental stage between
adolescence and adulthood generally spanning ages eighteen to
twenty-four.
A. PUBLIC HEALTH DIMENSIONS

Teen drivers aged sixteen to nineteen crash at rates four times
higher than those twenty and older. 24 This group of teen drivers
25
also has nearly three times the fatal crash rate per mile driven.
An estimated 48,000 sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds will die in car
crashes between 2003 and 2012, and well over 2 million more will
Even higher numbers of
suffer crash-related injuries. 26
nonteenaged drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, moreover, are
27
injured or killed each year in crashes caused by teen drivers.
States, often prodded by the promise of federal monies, have
enacted various measures to reduce crash-related injuries and
These
fatalities among teens and the general population.
See infra Part II.C.
See Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 212 (2009) (defining
22
23

"adolescence" similarly).
24 Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 47.
25
26

INS. INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1.
See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 tbl.2-1 (reporting analysis based on

calculations from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System). In 2004 alone, for example,
more than 300,000 fifteen- to twenty-year-olds were injured in collisions. Id.
27 In crashes leading to fatalities, twice as many non-drivers as drivers (i.e., passengers
or individuals traveling in other vehicles) lose their lives, as a majority of all drivers survive
crashes in which there are fatalities. Williams & Tison, supra note 5, at 146.
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measures have included seatbelt laws, an increased legal drinking
2
age, and stricter requirements for acquiring early licensure. 8
Together with improved vehicle safety, these measures have
yielded positive effects. The crash-related death rate for fifteen- to
nineteen-year-olds peaked in 1970 at 43.6 deaths per 100,000
resident population, then began to decline-first modestly,
reaching 43.0 in 1980, then significantly, to 33.1 by 1990. In the
years following 1990, however, the teen death rate declined
modestly but has since plateaued-reaching 26.0 in 2000, 23.3 in
2006, then remaining at 22.0 in the years that followed. 29 Table 1
graphically depicts this trend.
30
Table 1.

Teen Crash Fatality Rates, 1970-2007
50
40

30
20
10

0

,

1970

I

1980

1990

,

2000 2006 2007

NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2010: WITH
SPECIAL FEATURE ON DEATH AND DYING 176-79 tbl.37 (2011). Researchers calculate crash
rates using different methods, all of which portray crash prevalence based on some unit of
exposure. Global levels of exposure include, for example, population size or total vehicle miles
driven. Individual levels of exposure, which are more difficult to obtain, can include personmiles driven or time spent driving. No single measure can provide a truly comprehensive
depiction of crashes; instead, each provides different information. Shope & Bingham, supra
note 7, at S262. In population-based rates, researchers can control for changes in population
sizes between groups across years. Id. One factor that remains unaccounted for, however, is
the potential change over time in the amount of driving done by individuals in a given group.
Thus if male teens drove on average 50 miles per week in 1975 but 200 miles per week in
2000, a crash rate that remained unchanged or even increased slightly might indicate an
increase, rather than a decrease, in safety. For this reason, as well as for concision, this
Article will generally report rates per person-mile driven.
30 NAT'L CTR. HEALTH STAT., supra note 29, at 176, tbl.37; see also Shope & Bingham,
supra note 7, at S262 fig.1 (breaking the rates down by gender).
28
29
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Crashes involving teen drivers impose significant economic
costs, which exceeded $40 billion annually even a decade ago. 3 1 In
addition to the direct costs of health care and rehabilitation
services, individuals and families absorb the indirect costs of
injuries and deaths-the loss of earnings and household services
otherwise contributed by the injured family members, the costs of
caring for them, and frequently, the loss of earnings of non-injured
family members who must reallocate their time from market to
32
caregiving work.
This section next describes characteristics of adolescent crash
involvement generally. It then focuses more closely on the crash
involvement of teens of different ages.
1. Single- vs. Multiple-Vehicle Crashes. Young drivers are
overrepresented in single-vehicle crashes, which tend to cause
more severe injuries than do multiple-vehicle crashes. 33 Young
drivers living outside of cities are less likely to crash overall
compared to young urban drivers, but they are at greater risk of
more serious, single-vehicle crashes. 34 For example, one study of
newly licensed teen drivers in Connecticut found that, in the
crashes in which the teenagers were at fault (76% of the crashes in
which they were involved), nearly 40% occurred when the driver
35
ran off the road.
2. Gender. The crash rates for both female and male young
drivers are significantly higher than for older drivers. 36 Crash risk
differs by gender, however, at most ages. Young and middle-aged
males both have historically had approximately 60% higher rates
of traffic violations, car crashes, and fatal car crashes, than their

31 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 7, at 8 (citing TRANSP. RESEARCH CTR., YOUNG
DRIVERS: THE ROAD TO SAFETY (2006)). In 2002, motor-vehicle crashes involving fifteen- to
twenty-year-old drivers cost the United States approximately $41 billion. Id. Research
uncovered no publicly-available cost estimates from more recent years.
32 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 7, at 7-8.
33 H.Y. Chen et al., Risk and Type of Crash Among Young Drivers by Rurality of Residence:
Findingsfrom the DRIVE Study, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 676, 679 (2009).
34 Id. at 681.
35 Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 49, 50 tbl.5. The study found that 31% of the crashes
involved rear-ending another vehicle, and 20% involved violating another car's right-of-way.
Id. at 50 tbl.5.
36 See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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female counterparts.3 7 The difference between the crash rates of
male and female teens has tended to be even greater, with male
teens having much higher crash rates.38 The gap between the
crash rates of male and female teens has narrowed somewhat over
time, but it remains significant. 39 For female adolescents, the
overall crash rate per mile driven is currently about three times as
high as the rate for older drivers; for male adolescents, the rate is
40
six times as high.
3.

Sixteen- and Seventeen- Year-Old Drivers vs. Older Teen

Drivers. Traffic and highway safety researchers have conducted
large-scale studies of the driving and crash patterns of "novice"
drivers-i.e., those in the first two years of licensure permitting
unsupervised driving. 41 These studies have found crash rates to be
consistently
highest
among
sixteen-year-olds,
declining
substantially with each year of increasing age. 4 2 Crash rates in

37 J.J. Arnett, Developmental Sources of Crash Risk in Young Drivers, 8 INJURY
PREVENTION, at iil7, iil9 (2002); Carol Holland et al., Differential Moderating Effect of
Locus of Control on Effect of Driving Experience in Young Male and Female Drivers, 48
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 821, 821 (2010).
Is NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 6-7.
39 Id. The problem of young male driver fatalities exists in other developed nations as
well. In Queensland, Australia, for example, 81% of all seventeen- to twenty-four year old
drivers killed in car crashes in 2010 were male. Bridie Scott-Parker et al., Speeding by
Young Novice Drivers: What Can Personal Characteristicsand Psychosocial Theory Add to
Our Understanding?,50 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 242, 243 (2013).
40 Robert D. Laird, Teenage Driving Offers Challenges and Potential Rewards for
Developmentalists, 5 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 311, 311 (2011) (comparing adolescent crash rates
with those for drivers aged thirty to fifty-nine).
41 See Nils Petter Gregersen et al., Accident Involvement Among Learner Drivers-an
Analysis of the Consequences of Supervised Practice, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
725, 727 (2003) (comparing the crash risk of drivers during supervised practice to that of
drivers during the first two years of licensure); Daniel R. Mayhew et al., Changes in
Collision Rates Among Novice Drivers During the First Months of Driving, 35 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 683, 684 (2003) (studying crash risk of drivers during first two
years of licensure in Nova Scotia).
42 Anne T. McCartt et al., Driving Experience, Crashes and Traffic Citations of Teenage
Beginning Drivers, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 311, 311 (2013); id. Per mile
driven, sixteen-year-olds have nearly three times as many crashes overall as nineteen-yearolds, and more than twice as many fatal crashes. Id.; INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY,
supra note 1. Studies found that sixteen-year-olds had 31 crashes per million miles
traveled, compared to 9 for nineteen-year-olds, and 9.1 fatal crashes per 100 million miles
traveled compared to 3.8. Allan F. Williams, Teenage Drivers: Patterns of Risk, 34 J.
SAFETY RES. 5, 6 tbls.1 & 3 (2003). These data are comparable to 1990 crash rates, where
sixteen-year-olds had 43 crashes per million miles driven compared with 15 for eighteen- to
nineteen-year-olds. Allan F. Williams et al., Characteristicsof Fatal Crashes of 16-Year-Old
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general decline with both maturity (estimated in terms of
chronological age) and experience (estimated by number of miles
driven).43 As a group, all novice drivers have higher crash rates
than do more experienced drivers. 44 At each month of driving
experience, however, younger novices have significantly higher
crash rates than do older novices. 4 5 In the first few months of
driving, young novices' crash rate is twice that of older novices. 46
The gap narrows over time, but a 45% difference in crash rates
47
persists even after two years of licensure.
Increasingly refined studies have found that age-related factors
predominate in the earlier years of adolescence, then decline
relative to experience. 48 Thus, the crash risk for fifteen-year-old
beginners is much higher than that for seventeen-year-old
beginners, but eighteen-year-old beginners have only a slightly
higher crash risk than twenty-year-old beginners. 49 In other
words, at younger ages, driving inexperience plays a role, but a
secondary one. 50
At later ages, different levels of driving
experience account for more of the differences in crash rates. 5 1
Crash rates are consistently highest for the youngest novice
drivers, for whom age- and development-related factors compound
52
the risk related to their driving inexperience.

Drivers: Implications for Licensure Policies, 16 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 347, 347 (1995)
(reporting data derived from the 1990 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey).
43 A. James McKnight & A. Scott McKnight, Young Novice Drivers: Careless or Clueless?,
35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 921, 921 (2003).
44Id.
45 Mayhew et al., supra note 41, at 685.
46 Id. (reporting crash rates of 114 per 10,000 young novice drivers compared to 56 per
10,000 older novice drivers).
47 Id. (reporting that young novices' crash rates drop to 49 per 10,000 drivers after two
years, compared to 27 per 10,000 for older novices).
48 See Nils Petter Gregersen & Per Bjurulf, Young Novice Drivers: Towards a Model of
Their Accident Involvement, 28 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 229, 231 (1996) (citing
several such studies).
49 Id.

5o Allan F. Williams, Young Driver Risk Factors:Successful and Unsuccessful Approaches
for Dealing with Them and an Agenda for the Future, 12 INJURY PREVENTION, at i4, i4
(Supp. 1 2006).
51 See Gregersen & Bjurulf, supra note 48, at 231 (finding that experience is more
important than age from seventeen years of age).
52 Id.
Consistent with other researchers' findings, Gregersen and Bjurulf conclude that
"[t]he initial level of risk is ... reduced with higher licensing age, showing that other, ageinfluenced aspects are also [along with experience,] of importance." Id.
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Daniel Mayhew of the Traffic Injury Research Foundation and
colleagues, in an article tracing the historical evolution of the
presumptive age of licensure, concluded that states' widespread
adoption of age sixteen as the minimum licensing age has "had a
significant and unfortunately negative impact on road safety in
terms of premature death and injury among 16 and 17 year olds in
North America for many decades." 53 After Canada lowered its age
of licensure from eighteen to sixteen, for example, new drivers'
accident involvement increased by an estimated 12%, and new
54
driver fatalities by 24%.
Empirical research thus strongly suggests that some part of
adolescent driving risk stems from lack of skill and driving
experience, but that the greater part of that risk stems from
normative developmental factors that correlate with age. Part III
draws on learning theory and research in adolescent development
to help explain this evidence, which demonstrates that some
experience-related driving risk may be ameliorated through
education programs or other interventions, but that developmentrelated driving risk cannot.
B. REGULATORY CONTEXTS

This section chronicles states' adoption of general licensure
requirements, the emergence of sixteen as the presumptive age of
licensure, and the implementation, beginning in the late 1990s, of
graduated licensing systems.
It concludes that, given the
overwhelming evidence of the high crash and fatality rates of
young drivers, comprehensive regulatory efforts to rein in the
young driver problem came inexplicably late and remain
55
profoundly insufficient.

,3 Daniel R. Mayhew et al., Why 16?, INS. INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, Aug. 2000, at 2, available
at http://www.iihs.org/frontend/iihs/documents/masterfledocs.ashx?id=1261. Mayhew, Senior
Vice President of the Traffic Injury Research Foundation, has studied and published research
on road safety and young drivers for more than three decades. See Dan Mayhew, TRAFFIC &
INJ. RES. FOUND., http://www.tirf.ca/about/2012-bios-danm.pdf (last visited June 7, 2014)
(listing career and research highlights).
4 Gregersen & Bjurulf, supra note 48, at 231. Canada lowered its age of licensure in
1962. Id.
5 See Herb M. Simpson, The Evolution and Effectiveness of Graduated Licensing, 34 J.
SAFETY RES. 25, 27 (2003) (noting that regulatory efforts such as graduated licensing
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1. Regulation and Emergence of the Age of Licensure. States
largely left passenger cars and their drivers unregulated until the
early twentieth century, when the proliferation of cars on
roadways not designed to handle them led to pollution, noise,
collisions, and growing numbers of casualties. 56 States initially
addressed the growing problems by imposing speed limits,
requiring safety-enhancing features such as brakes and
headlights, and, to improve compliance and assist with
57
enforcement, imposing car registration requirements.
Northeastern and more urbanized states were the first to
require that all drivers be licensed. 58 The earliest licensure laws
generally included no minimum age restrictions, but states soon
recognized that younger drivers posed a greater threat to public
safety than did older drivers.5 9 A few states passed laws
prohibiting individuals below a minimum age-usually eighteenfrom driving,
even before
enacting
general
licensure

systems saw virtually no progress until the late 1980's in New Zealand, and even there it
evolved slowly).
56 See JOHN A. HEITMANN, THE AUTOMOBILE AND AMERICAN LIFE 19 (2009) (describing
the "spectacular rise in American auto production" in the early twentieth century, which
was spurred on by the fact that the fledgling auto industry faced "virtually no government
restriction," and which resulted in the proliferation of gasoline-powered automobiles chosen
for their ability to deal with poor roads); Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 10 (noting that
public authorities began to realize in the early 1900s that they needed to deal with the rise
in congestion, collisions, and deaths that coincided with the rise in motorization, but that
the rapid proliferation of vehicles "left lawmakers far behind"). At the beginning of the
twentieth century, new automotive manufacturing techniques accelerated production and
fueled an exponential growth in automobile ownership. See HEITMANN, supra, at 19
(suggesting that the spectacular rise in American auto production resulted from the use of
uniformly machined parts and economies of scale). Cars powered by internal combustion
engines had been available by the end of the nineteenth century, but labor-intensive
production processes limited their availability. See id. at 18-19 (discussing the work of
several pre-nineteenth century pioneers, but showing that the significant rise in vehicle
production did not begin until manufacturing techniques advanced). From 1907 to 1920,
the number of motor-vehicle related deaths increased from approximately 400 to 12,500.
Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 10.
67 Abbott, supra note 20, at 614-15.
58 See Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 4 (noting that Massachusetts and Missouri were
the first to adopt such laws, followed by several other northeastern states). Early licensure
requirements applied only to paid chauffeurs, who were believed to have less incentive to
drive carefully than did car owners themselves. See Abbott, supra note 20, at 615-16
(discussing contemporary licensure requirements for chauffeurs).
59 See Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 6-7, 18 (discussing in depth the origins of age
requirements).
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requirements. 60 Pennsylvania's 1909 law was the first to contain
provisions aimed at younger drivers, requiring those under
eighteen to obtain a special license. 6 1 Some states introduced
"junior operator" licenses akin to today's learner's permits and
provisional licenses, which allowed sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds to drive only with adult supervision or subject to other
restrictions .62
The needs of families in agricultural communities, who tended
to rely on the labor of their younger adolescents, led many farm
states to adopt lower minimum licensing ages-typically fourteen,
63

fifteen, or sixteen.
Mayhew and colleagues have noted that many child labor laws
permitted teens aged fourteen to sixteen and those aged sixteen to
eighteen to perform certain defined categories of work (generally
prohibiting those younger than fourteen from working), which may
help explain the eventual convergence on age sixteen as the
minimum age of licensure. 64 In 1926, the National Conference for
Street Highway Safety promulgated the Uniform Vehicle Code,
recommending age sixteen as the minimum age for licensure but
65
requiring parental consent in order for minors to obtain a license.

Courts held that parents who allowed adolescents to drive in
violation of statutory minimum age requirements themselves
acted negligently and could be held liable for the injuries
subsequently caused by their children's negligent vehicle

60

See id. at 6 (listing five states-Colorado, Illinois, Maine, New York, and Texas).

61

Id.

Id. at 7. New York's statute provided, for example, that "[n]o person shall operate or
drive a motor vehicle who is under eighteen years of age, unless such person is accompanied
by a duly licensed chauffeur or the owner of the motor vehicle being operated." N.Y. HIGH.
LAW § 282(2) (Consol. 1917).
63 See Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 7, 9-10 (noting fifteen predominantly rural states
adopting these minimum ages, and explaining it in terms of the need for adolescent labor in
agriculture). Some states also legislated exceptions to minimum age requirements that
allowed younger persons to operate farm vehicles. Id. at 14.
64 Id. at 9-10. Even before Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, state
legislatures, acting on the general growing concern for children and adolescents ascendant
in the early twentieth century, enacted child labor laws to protect children from
employment deemed abusive or otherwise harmful to them. Id.
65 Id.; James P. Economos, Driver Licensing and the Court, 17 TRAFFIC DIG. & REV. 3
(1969).
62
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operation. 66 Influenced perhaps by both the Uniform Code and the
general trend among states, most states that introduced minimum
licensure ages in the 1920s set their licensing age at sixteen.6 7
Less than ten years after adopting the first Uniform Code,
however, the National Conference amended its age-related
provisions, concluding that a better approach to licensure would
take account of state-specific factors-e.g., in-state crash records of
minors, the types of hazards present on the state's highways, or
other conditions particular to the state. 68
State legislatures
declined to revisit the issue, though, retaining their preestablished minimum ages of licensure through the twentieth
century-sixteen for most, fourteen or fifteen in a few, and in the
69
State of New Jersey only, seventeen.
2. Conventional Licensing. For much of the twentieth century,
obtaining a license was quick and easy. Most states simply
required that applicants pass a written exam and a road test.70
The exams generally tested basic knowledge of traffic rules, and
the road tests required that drivers demonstrate a minimal level of
competency. 7 1 Successful applicants immediately acquired full
licensure-i.e., the entitlement to drive without supervision or
other restrictions 72
More states began issuing junior operator licenses, which
became known as learners' permits.7 3 Learner's permits allow
beginning drivers to gain practice under adult supervision prior to
applying for licensure.7 4 Today, most states permit adolescents to
66 See, e.g., Schultz v. Morrison, 91 Misc. 248, 250-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915) ('While the
relation of parent and child does not render the parent liable for the torts of the child,
nevertheless a parent may become liable for an injury caused by the child where the
parent's negligence made it possible for the child to cause the injury." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
67 See Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 9-10 (noting that these two factors "influenced
other states to follow suit" and that "some degree of uniformity was achieved").
6 Id. at 13.
69 Id.; Williams, supra note 50, at i5; see also Allan F. Williams & Daniel R. Mayhew,
Graduated Licensing and Beyond, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S324, S324 (Supp. 2008)
(summarizing an analysis of U.S. licensure laws prior to 1996).
70 See Simpson, supra note 55, at 26 (discussing licensure requirements under
conventional licensing systems).
71 Id.

Id.
73 See Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 7.
74 Simpson, supra note 55, at 26.
72
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acquire learners' permits by ages fourteen to sixteen, with
parental consent. 75 While they initially tended to be optional,
states began making the learner's permit a precondition for full
licensure. 76 Most states now require that a learner's permit be
held for some minimum period, from sixty days to a year, prior to
77
applying for licensure.
In an attempt to curb the high crash rates of novice drivers
(those whose licenses permit unsupervised driving), several states
added probationary or provisional licensure stages preceding full
licensure. 78 Probationary licensure subjects novice drivers who
commit violations to more severe penalties (generally fines or
79
license suspension) than would apply to fully-licensed drivers.
Evaluations of probationary licensing systems have found them to
have modest positive effects.8 0
Provisional licenses impose
restrictions on novice drivers' privileges, most commonly including
nighttime driving and passenger restrictions. 81 The same sorts of
restrictions constitute components of the more recently adopted
82
graduated licensing systems adopted by states.
Many states introduced formal driver education programs in
the early- to mid-twentieth century as a way to improve young
drivers' skills and safety.8 3
Completing a driver education
program became a prerequisite for sixteen- and seventeen-yearolds seeking licensure.8 4 Those who did not complete a driver
education program were required to wait until age eighteen before
5
seeking licensure.8

75 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 17.
76

Id.

77 Daniel R. Mayhew et al., The Learner'sPermit, 34 J. SAFETY RES. 35, 36 (2003).
78 Simpson, supra note 55, at 26.
79 Id.
80 Id.; Williams, supra note 50, at i5; Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S324. Critics
have argued that probationary licensing fails to assist drivers whose errors reflect lack of
skill rather than intentional disregard of driving rules. For these drivers, they argue, a
suspension further reducing driving practice may be counterproductive; and to the extent
that poor driving skill has already resulted in a crash, remedial action comes too late.
Simpson, supra note 55, at 26.
81 Simpson, supranote 55, at 26.
82 See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
83 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 15.
84 Id. at 16.
85 Id.
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The demand for driver education exploded in the 1950s and
1960s.8 6
The private insurance industry, believing driver
education to be a potential crash-reduction measure, offered
discounts to students who completed driver education, and the
federal government began providing funds to states that offered
87
driver education.
Evaluations of driver education programs in the decades that
followed, however, consistently found that they failed to reduce
driver crash risk.88 Researchers have attributed their lack of
success to the short duration of the courses, their focus on only the
most basic skills, and their reliance on unsophisticated safety
messages easily superseded by other social influences.8 9
Even more troubling than the failure of driver education to
reduce crash and fatality risk were findings that, by enabling
earlier licensure, driver education appeared to have increased the
number and risk of crashes for young drivers. 90 Students who
completed driver-education programs were more likely to obtain
licensure, be in car crashes, and incur traffic violations than
students who did not participate in driver education. 91 Driver
education also had the unintended effect of exacerbating young
drivers' optimism bias-the unfounded belief that one is more
skilled and less likely to experience a collision than one's peerspotentially
because
participants
in
training
programs
overestimated the skills gained from the program. 92 Drivers'
93
optimism bias correlates with overconfidence and risk-taking.
By greatly increasing the number of young licensed drivers
without decreasing their crash rates, the net effect of driver

86

Id.

87

Id. at 15-16.

88 Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S324.

Williams, supra note 50, at i5.
90 Soc'y for Adolescent Med., Driver Education: Position Paper of the Society for
Adolescent Medicine, 21 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 416, 416-17 (1997) (arguing for the repeal
of legislation providing for earlier licensure for adolescents who have completed a driver
education course).
91 Id. at 417.
92 White et al., supra note 6, at 1310.
93 Chris G. Sibley & Niki Harr6, A Gender Role Socialization Model of Explicit and
Implicit Biases in Driving Self-Enhancement, 12 TRANSP. RES. PART F: TRAFFIC PYSCHOL. &
BEHAV. 452,459 (2009).
89
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94
education was a much higher adolescent traffic fatality rate.
Following these disappointing research findings, the federal
government withdrew funding for driver education programs, and
their popularity and availability decreased significantly. 95
3. GraduatedDriver Licensing. After a pair of 1971 studies of
North Carolina drivers found younger drivers to be particularly
overrepresented in crashes at night and when driving with
passengers, transportation safety researchers proposed a licensing
system whose goal was to enable new drivers to gain driving
experience under conditions that minimized their exposure to
96
risk.
The proposed system, known as Graduated Driver Licensing
(GDL), was not particularly radical. GDL comprises three phases
of licensure-the learner's permit, a provisional license, and full
97
licensure.
The first phase of GDL is the learner's permit phase, which
involves a period of supervised driving. 98 Unlike the learner's
permit provisions of some conventional systems, however, the
learner's permit in a GDL system is mandatory and must be held
for a minimum period of time, from several months to a year. 99
After holding a learner's permit for the statutorily prescribed
period of time and completing the set number of practice hours
where required, applicants may obtain provisional licenses. 10 0
Like the provisional licensure requirements in conventional
systems, the GDL provisional license permits unsupervised
driving but imposes restrictions aimed at reducing the novice's

91 Leon S. Robertson, Crash Involvement of Teenaged Drivers When Driver Education is
Eliminatedfrom High School, 70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 599, 599 (1980).
The National Highway Traffic Safety
95 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 16.
Administration abandoned driver education as a priority by 1982. Id.
96 Simpson, supra note 55, at 27; Patricia F. Waller, The Genesis of GDL, 34 J. SAFETY
RES. 17, 17-18 (2003).
97 James Hedlund et al., What We Know, What We Don't Know, and What We Need to
Know About GraduatedDriver Licensing, 34 J. SAFETY RES. 107, 107 (2003); Simpson, supra
note 55, at 27; Patricia F. Waller, Challenging the Status Quo in Driver Licensing, 76
TRAFFIC SAFETY 20 (1976).

98 Hedlund et al., supranote 97, at 109.
99 Simpson, supra note 55, at 27. Some states require parents to verify that the learner
has completed a requisite number of supervised practice hours. Hedlund et al., supra note
97, at 110.
100 Hedlund et al., supra note 97, at 111.
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exposure to hazardous driving contexts. 10 1 The most common
examples include passenger restrictions, nighttime driving
restrictions, and prohibitions on operating on high-speed

roadways. 102
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
developed a model GDL law in 1977, but it was two decades before
the states took legislative note of it.103 Instead, the first
jurisdiction to implement a true GDL system based on the North
Carolina and NHTSA models was not a U.S. jurisdiction at all, but
instead New Zealand, which adopted GDL legislation in 1987.104
Empirical evidence of the positive effects of its system then
provided added impetus for U.S. jurisdictions to follow suit.10 5
In the early 1990s, Congress charged the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent government
investigative agency, to issue safety recommendations to the states
in order to legislatively address the ongoing problem of crashes by
teenagers. 10 6 The NTSB issued safety recommendations in 1993,
proposing the adoption of GDL, 10 7 and later updated its

recommendations
to include passenger108 and wireless109
communication-device restrictions.
In 1996, Florida was the first U.S. state to replace its
conventional licensure system with a GDL system.110 Its system
101 Id.
102

Id.

JULIE A. CROKE & WILLIAM B. WILSON, MODEL FOR PROVISIONAL (GRADUATED)
LICENSING OF YOUNG NOVICE DRIVERS (1977); Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S32425.
104 Simpson, supra note 55, at 27; Waller, supra note 96, at 22.
105 See Simpson, supra note 55, at 29 (noting "substantial reductions in casualty
103

collisions").
106 For a discussion of NHTSA and NTSB recommendations, as well as the 1996 GDL
Model Law based on the NTSB recommendations and adopted by the National Commission
on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, see Michelle Browning Coughlin, Proposing a

Uniform National GraduatedDriver License Law to Reduce Motor-Vehicle FatalitiesAmong
Teenagers, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 495, 500-04, 509-10 (2008).
107 NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY RECOMMENDATION H-93-1 THROUGH -9, at 13-14
(Mar. 11, 1993), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/1993/H93_1_9.pdf.
108 NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY RECOMMENDATION H-02-30 AND -31, at 1 (Nov. 8,
2002, availableat http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2002/H02-30_31.pdf.
1o9NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY RECOMMENDATION H-03-08 AND -09, at 5 (June 13,
2003), availableat http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2003/HO3_08_O9.pdf.
110 Anne T. McCartt et al., Graduated Licensing Laws and Fatal Crashes of Teenage
Drivers:A National Study, 11 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 240, 241 (2010).
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included a six-month mandatory learner's phase and nighttime
driving curfews for sixteen-year-olds (eleven p.m. to six a.m.) and
seventeen-year-olds (one a.m. to five a.m.), unless accompanied by
an adult or traveling to or from work.11 '
Since then, every state has implemented at least some
component of GDL; some are comprehensive and include each of
its primary elements, while others only include limited aspects of
it.112
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety recommends
that states implement a learner's permit phase, available no
earlier than age sixteen, a nighttime restriction beginning no later
than ten p.m., and a passenger restriction that allows no more
than one passenger, with night and passenger restrictions in place
113
until at least age eighteen.
In states that adopted graduated licensing provisions, crashes
among sixteen-year-old drivers decreased between 10% and as
Researchers attribute the success of GDL
much as 30%.114
systems in reducing teen crash risk to two primary factors: First,
GDL delays unsupervised driving and limits the exposure of young
drivers to more challenging driving conditions (e.g., nighttime
driving restrictions substantially reduce nighttime crashes).11 5
Second, GDL requires beginning drivers to perform the type of
extended supervised practice and gain driving experience that may
l1 6
reduce crashes.
Even after the implementation of GDL systems, however, young
drivers continue to be significantly overrepresented in crash
statistics.1 17 Researchers note that many states have suboptimal
GDL systems, and that young drivers' compliance with existing
requirements is imperfect.1 1 8 Most importantly, perhaps, GDL
I1 Allan F. Williams et al., Views of Parents of Teenagers About Graduated Licensing
Systems, 29 J. SAFETY RES. 1, 2 (1998).
12 Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S325.
113 Id.
at S326 (citing INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, GRADUATED LICENSING: A
BLUEPRINT FOR NORTH AMERICA (2004)).
114 Christine Branche et al., GraduatedLicensing for Teens: Why Everybody's Doing It, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 146, 146 (Supp. 2002); Anne T. McCartt et al., Age of Licensure and
Monitoring Teenagers' Driving: Survey of Parents of Novice Teenage Drivers, 38 J. SAFETY
RES. 697, 698 (2007).
115Hedlund et al., supra note 97, at 109.
116 Id.
117 Scott-Parker et al., supra note 39, at 249.
118Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S325.
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systems reflect a compromise that still allows a considerable
amount of driving at relatively young ages. 119 And as noted above,
young drivers' crash, injury, and fatality rates result from both
age-related developmental factors and driving inexperience. 120 As
one of its original architects has observed, GDL aims at reducing
the inexperience component of young drivers' crash risk; it was not
designed, nor is it capable of addressing, deliberate rule-flouting,
risk-taking, or impulsive behaviors often associated with young
12
drivers (and addressed at greater length in Part III, infra). 1
C. SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT

Passenger cars most obviously serve what has become an
essential social function-private transportation facilitating
individuals' mobility. In the late nineteenth and early- to midtwentieth centuries, especially in rural and agricultural states,
adolescent driving also enabled young people to contribute vital
labor to family production work. 122 Cars and driving have also
come to serve social functions and comprise cultural meanings far
beyond their utilitarian transportation-related purposes, however.
This section examines the most significant of these.
1. Social Functions. How necessary is the increased mobility of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds made possible by their licensure?
In the 2007 report of a National Academy of Sciences workshop, an
interdisciplinary group of researchers studying adolescent health
and development and traffic safety concluded that "there is no
good reason to license young people to drive at age 16."123 At the
same time, researchers have acknowledged, and legislation has
reflected, that the mobility made possible by early licensure can
provide significant benefits both to adolescents and their
124
families.
Historically, young people in farming communities operated
farm equipment at an early age, commonly using roads to travel

119Id.
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Waller, supranote 96, at 19.
Mayhew et al., supranote 53, at 10.
NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 42.
Mayhew et al., supranote 53, at 13-14.
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between fields. 125
The percentage of Americans engaged in
agricultural work has plummeted, however-from 35% in the early
years of the twentieth century to 2.5% today. 126 Today's farmers
produce between five and ten times the output per man-hour
12
worked as did farmers at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Farming simply does not require the manpower it once did, and
the need of agrarian families to have young teens licensed and able
to contribute to the family's production work has thus all but
disappeared.
Researchers today regularly allude to the need for adolescent
12
mobility, however, particularly in suburban and rural areas.
Yet there is scant empirical work examining the necessity of
adolescent mobility. A 1985 study compared the lifestyles of
licensed and unlicensed fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds in three
states and found higher rates of licensure associated with teens
performing more family errands (e.g., shopping) and providing
transportation for siblings (both of which ease parents' burden),
whereas lower rates were associated with greater reliance on
parents or other family members for transportation. 129 On the
other hand, lower rates of licensure did not reduce job holding or
participation in social activities requiring transportation, nor did it
increase use of public transportation. 130 A study of New Jersey's
seventeen-year-old licensing age found the lifestyle effects of the
131
higher licensing age to be minimal.
In light of the geographic and economic realities of American
(particularly nonurban) family life, one imagines that early
licensure can indeed provide familial benefits. Adolescent mobility
can facilitate adolescents commuting to and from school,

Id. at 14.
Stephen Moore & Julian L. Simon, The Greatest Century That Ever Was: 25
Miraculous Trends of the Past 100 Years, POL'Y ANALYSIS NO. 364, Dec. 15, 1999, at 6 tbl.1,
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa364.pdf.
127 Id. at 17 fig.13.
128 Allan F. Williams & David F. Preusser, Night Driving Restrictions for Youthful
125
126

Drivers:A LiteratureReview and Commentary, 18 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 334, 335 (1997).
129 David F. Preusser et al., Driver Licensing Age and Lifestyles of 16 Year Olds, 75 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 358, 359-60 (1985). The states were Michigan, New Jersey, and New York. Id.
130 Id.
at 360. Regional unemployment rates and child labor laws did affect teen
employment. Id. at 359-60.
131 McCartt et al., supra note 114, at 698.
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extracurricular and social activities, and paid work, 132 relieving
parents of some of the time-consuming and logistically challenging
demands of serving as their children's chauffeurs (particularly
when parents must simultaneously meet work and other
133
household responsibilities).
At the same time, however, parentalsupport for early licensure
to lighten parents' own chauffeuring burdens finds more support
in anecdotal evidence and assumptions than in empirical data. In
one study surveying parents in several states whose teenagers
were taking their first on-road driving tests, virtually no parents
cited the need for help with transportation as justifying their teens
obtaining licenses as early as possible. 134 In two of the states, no
parent cited teens' own job-related commutes as justifying early
licensure; 5% of parents in a third state cited teens' own job13 5
related obligations.
A higher proportion of U.S. adolescents drive than in most other
countries. 136 The age of licensure is higher in most developed
countries than in the United States-in the E.U., for example, the
average age of licensure is eighteen. 137 Even when European teens
have the option of obtaining licensure, however, they do so at rates
significantly lower than do U.S. teens. In France, for example, the
presumptive age of licensure is eighteen, but sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds who complete a training program may obtain
licensure earlier. 138 Most young French people, however, decline to
132

Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 14. In 1929, New York, for example, made provisions

for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to obtain junior permits allowing them to drive to and
from work or school. Id.
133 Laird, supra note 40, at 314; see also Arthur L. Kellermann & Ricardo Martinez, Hot
Wheels, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S310, 8310 (Supp. 2008) (providing an anecdote from a
co-author's life). Kellermann and Ricardo write that Kellermann's wife advocated in favor
of buying their mid-adolescent son a car, arguing that "'[h]e's a good student, he's stayed
out of trouble, and he promises to be careful ....
And besides, I'm sick and tired of
schlepping him around.'" Id. Kellerman, who is an emergency physician and director of an
injury prevention center, reported that their son caused a crash that caused extensive
damage (but no injuries, largely thanks to the car's advanced safety features, according to
Kellerman) to both cars involved. Id. at S310-11.
134 McCartt et al., supra note 114, at 701 tbl.5. No parents cited this as a factor in
Minnesota, and only 2% of North Carolina and Rhode Island parents did so. Id.
135 Id.
No parent cited this factor in either Minnesota or North Carolina; 5% of Rhode
Island parents did so. Id.
136 Williams & Preusser, supra note 128, at 335.
137 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 18.
138 Id. The French refer to this system as the "apprentissage" system of driver training. Id.
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participate in the early licensure program-only about 10% of
them avail themselves of the opportunity. 139 In the United States,
on the other hand, the vast majority of young people obtain
licensure as early as permitted by the laws of their respective
states. 140 It is possible that alternative modes of transportation
meet the mobility needs of European adolescents, reducing the
importance of providing for early licensure.14 1 European countries
tend to be highly urbanized and have extensive public
transportation systems. 142 Cycling is also a more common mode of
transportation than it is in the United States, facilitated by
14 3
shorter distances between rural areas and urban centers.
Finally, car owners pay significantly higher taxes abroad than
they do in the United States, making car ownership less
accessible.144
Wholly apart from their transportation function, cars can also
provide an actual physical space that serves as an important social
context for U.S. adolescents. 145 Cars function as a place where
1 46
adolescents can be together, independent of parental oversight.
For adolescents who live at home but prefer the company of friends
away from the presence and monitoring of parents (which,
according to developmentalists, describes most adolescents), the
transportation function of a car can thus become secondary to its
social function. 14 7 For emerging adults (those aged eighteen to
mid-twenties), the social function of the car may become less
salient, since they are more likely to live independently of their
parents and thus have less need to use the car as a social
gathering place. 148
139

Id.

141

Id.
Id.

142

Id.

140

143 Id.

Arnett, supranote 37, at ii20.
id. (noting that in the United States, there is a sense that without a car, "you are
not really a legitimate member of American Society").
146 See Geoffrey Underwood, On-Road Behaviour of Younger and Older Novices During the
First Six Months of Driving, 58 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 235, 236 (2013)
("Younger drivers engaged in more leisure-time driving, used their car for fun, with
passengers, and for generally social purposes, whereas middle-aged drivers used their cars
mainly for commuting.").
147 Arnett, supra note 37, at iil8.
144

145 See

148

Id.
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2. CulturalMeanings. Licensure thus heralds the achievement
of an important milestone and is a much-anticipated
developmental rite of passage for most adolescents. 149 Driving is a
right withheld from children and younger adolescents, so the
acquisition of licensure signals a young person's movement into a
new quasi-status, one reserved for adolescents who have moved
one significant step closer to adulthood. 150 Many teens view
owning a car-or at least having regular access to one-as a near51
entitlement.
Teens thus tend to be highly motivated to acquire licensure as
soon as they are legally able. 152 Many parents may accede to early
licensure due to the strong desires of their teens to obtain
licensure as soon as permitted by state law-despite parents' own
reservations and preferences that their teens' licensure be
delayed. 153 As a result of the desires of their teens to acquire and
exercise the significant driving entitlement, Mayhew argues that
"parents too often allow inexperienced and immature youth to
154
operate motor vehicles."'
Licensing is not merely a symbolic marker of social status.
Teens perceive driving as affecting status among peers and also
the opposite sex/romantic interests. 155 Popular culture has for
decades portrayed driving itself-risky driving, in particular-as

149 Joseph P. Allen & Bradford Brown, Adolescents, Peers, and Motor Vehicles: The Perfect
Storm?, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S289, S289 (Supp. 2008); Robert Graham & Jennifer
Appleton Gootman, Overview and Introduction, Preventing Teen Motor Crashes:
Contributionsfrom the Behavioral and Social Sciences and Summary of the Report of the
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S253,
S255 (Supp. 2008); Bridie Scott-Parker et al., Understanding the Psychosocial Factors
Influencing the Risky Behaviour of Young Drivers, 12 TRANSP. RES. PART F: TRAFFIC
PSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 470, 470 (2009).
150 Bruce G. Simons-Morton et al., Increasing Parent Limits on Novice Young Drivers:
Cognitive Mediation of the Effect of Persuasive Messages, 21 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 83, 85
(2006).
151 Arnett, supra note 37, at ii20.
152 McCartt et al., supra note 114, at 701-02.
153 Id. at 705.
154 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 15 (citing DANIEL R. MAYHEW & HERBERT M.

SIMPSON, THE ROLE OF DRIVING EXPERIENCE:
LICENSING OF NEW DRIVERS (1995)).

155Scott-Parker et al., supra note 149, at 472-73.
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"cool, youthful, and fun."156 Race-car driving is an immensely
popular sport, and fast driving generally is promoted across
media. 157 The dangerous yet skillful driving in the car-chase
scenes typical of action movies exemplifies, for example, the
superior courage and masculinity of male protagonists. Audiences
for race-car driving and action movies consist predominantly of
teenage boys and emerging adult men, 158 although the extent to
which cultural messages influence adolescent behavior remains
unclear. 159
What is clear and incontrovertible is that teenaged males
engage in riskier driving behavior 160 and have higher crash and
fatality rates than do females. 161 Researchers have thus begun to
study more closely the gendered aspects of driving.
New Zealand psychologist Niki Harr6 and colleagues have
conducted a series of studies examining the interrelationships
between gender differences in driving behavior, traffic injury
rates, attitudes about risky driving, and gender role
identification. 6 2 They and other researchers have found that both
men and women have some tendency towards optimism bias,
viewing themselves as above-average drivers. 163 As noted above,
optimism bias concerns researchers, as it correlates not only with
a belief that one is at less risk of a crash than others, but also with
164
overconfidence and risk-taking.

156Daniel P. Keating & Bonnie Halpern-Felsher, Adolescent Drivers: A Developmental
Perspective on Risk, Proficiency, and Safety, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S272, S276 (Supp.
2008).
157J.T. Shope, Influences on Youthful Driving Behavior and Their Potential for Guiding
Interventions to Reduce Crashes, 12 INJURY PREVENTION, at i9, ill (Supp. 1 2006).
158Arnett, supra note 37, at ii19.
169Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S276.
160Allen & Brown, supra note 149, at S292.
161 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., Sibley & Harr6, supra note 93, at 454 (studying the role gender identification
plays in risky driving behavior and in both explicit and implicit self-enhancement biases);
Niki Harr6 & Chris G. Sibley, Explicit and Implicit Self-Enhancement Biases in Drivers and
Their Relationship to Driving Violations and Crash-Risk Optimism, 39 AcCIDENT ANALYSIS
& PREVENTION 1155, 1155 (2007) (studying 158 drivers in New Zealand using the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) to measure gender differences in crash-risk optimism).
163 Sibley & HarrY, supra note 93, at 452. In one sample of 136 young drivers, 93% of
males and 75% of females rated themselves as more skillful drivers than their peers. White
et al., supranote 6, at 1310.
16 Sibley & Harr6, supra note 93, at 453.
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Men have significantly higher levels of self-enhancement on the
ability dimension than do women, perceiving their driving ability
and skill level as superior to other drivers'. 16 5 Studies indicate
that this heightened bias exists explicitly (drivers consciously rate
themselves relative to others) as well as implicitly (instruments
measure drivers' reaction times when pairing concepts that reflect
unconscious or automatic associative beliefs).166
In other words, masculine gender role identification and driving
ability self-enhancement reflect not only consciously held or stated
beliefs about how males think they ought to behave, but also
automatic associations occurring outside of conscious awareness
and declared belief structures. Sibley and Harr6 found "an
extremely strong path between being a man, identifying as such[,]
and driving ability self-enhancement
at this automatic,
6
7
unconscious level.'
These findings led them to conclude that gender differences in
crash rates and fatality rates are at least partially the result of
socialization experiences that relate masculine identity with risktaking and that are absorbed from repeated pairings of these
68
concepts in society.'
Crash risk increases, moreover, when young male drivers are
accompanied by a male passenger, but decreases when they drive
with female passengers. 169 Based on these and other studies,
Arnett concluded that, while "[c]ourage and the willingness to take
risks in the face of danger is a requirement of manhood in many
cultures,... in American society it often takes the unfortunately
170
deadly form of dangerous driving."'
The following Part describes characteristics of adolescent
driving, the contextual factors that affect it (both internal and
16.

Id. at 452-53.

Id. at 453. To identify and measure implicit attitudes, researchers used the IAT,
where participants match concepts as quickly as possible, based on the theory that the more
quickly they match certain concepts, the more closely associated the concepts are in the
brain. Id. Men's reaction times were quicker than women's when matching the self relative
to others with words representing driving ability and skills. Id.
167 Id.
Explicit and implicit self-enhancement only weakly correlate, suggesting that they
reflect distinct mental processes, but each independently predicts crash-risk optimism. Id.
at 453.
166

168
169
170

Id. at 459.

Allen & Brown, supra note 149, at S292.
Arnett, supranote 37, at iil9.
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external to the adolescent), and the process of acquiring driving
competence.
III. THE ADOLESCENT DRIVER
17 1
All teen drivers crash at higher rates than do older drivers.
Younger teens, however, crash at rates significantly higher than
those of older teens. By far the highest crash rates are those of
sixteen-year-olds (250% higher than those of eighteen-year-olds),
followed by those of seventeen-year-olds (50% higher than those of
72
eighteen-year-olds).1
Inexperience and developmental immaturity are generally the
primary factors that contribute to adolescent crash risk. Driving
inexperience, however, is not the primary cause of the higher
crash risk of younger teens. At younger ages (fifteen to seventeen)
73
driving inexperience is secondary to developmental immaturity.'
The self-regulatory capacities essential to competent and safe
driving are still immature in adolescence, as observed in research
of adolescent behavior generally and driving behavior specifically,
174
and supported by research of the adolescent brain.
This Part explores adolescent driving inexperience and
developmental immaturity separately. The learning processes
required for the acquisition of competent driving skill differ little
from the processes required to acquire competence in other
complex psychomotor skills. After basic skill acquisition, true
competence comes only with actual practice and the experience
acquired with time and effort. Competent driving also requires
decision-making and regulatory maturity-competencies whose

171

Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 47. As a group, teens crash at four times the rate

than that of drivers aged twenty and over. Id. (reporting crash rates per mile driven); see
also McKnight & McKnight, supra note 43, at 921 ("[The non-fatal accident rate for 16year-old novices is more than 10 times that of adults and almost three times that of 18-yearolds."); Shope & Bingham, supra note 7, at S261 (breaking down teen crash rates by age and
comparing them to that of drivers aged forty-five to fifty-four).
172 Arnett, supra note 37, at il7; see also NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 6
(noting that drivers in their first six months of licensure, which in the United States are
likely to be younger teens, have higher fatal crash rates compared to more experienced
drivers than do drivers after their first six months of licensure).
173 See infra Part III.c.
174 See infra Part III.c.
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acquisition is incomplete in adolescence. 175 Aspects of adolescent
development and behavior that are relevant to driving are
normative-not pathological or aberrational-and are thus
resistant or not amenable to change through education or other
interventions.
This Part concludes by exploring the combined effects of agerelated developmental factors and inexperience on adolescent
driving risk. Any regulatory system that entrusts adolescents
with the responsibility of driving ought to account for these
separate causes of adolescent crash risk.
A. CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTEXTUAL INFLUENCES

This section first describes characteristics of adolescent drivers
that distinguish them both from adult and from non-adolescent
novice drivers. It then notes contextual factors that influence
adolescent driving, for better and for worse.
1.
Characteristics of Adolescent Driving. Young people's
driving differs from that of older drivers. Young drivers are more
likely than older drivers to drive at speeds that exceed posted
limits or that exceed speeds appropriate to driving conditions (e.g.,
in foul weather or on wet roadways). 176 Other characteristics of
young people's driving that increase their crash risk are smaller
gap acceptance, a tendency to follow vehicles too closely, to weave
through traffic and make illegal lane changes, and to fail to yield
the right of way at controlled intersections (e.g., stop signs and
traffic lights). 177 They have poorer hazard perception than do older
drivers, and are less likely to recognize and respond appropriately
to hazards and developing traffic risks.1 78 Young males generally

175

SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG

DRIVERS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH ON MOTOR

VEHICLE CRASHES AND INJURIES INVOLVING TEENAGE DRIVERS 9 (2009), available at http:/

www.youngdriversafety.org/docs/2008%2OMid-yr-rpt.pdf.
176 See Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 47 (finding that such behavior contributes to the
fatal crashes of sixteen-year-old drivers); Shope, supra note 157, at il0 (noting the tendency
of young drivers to speed).
177 Shope, supra note 157, at il0; Williams, supra note 50, at i4; see also Hedlund et al.,
supranote 97, at 108 (finding teenagers less able to assess driving hazards and more likely
to drive in a risky fashion than older drivers).
178 Alan E. Drummond, The Role of Experience in Improving Young DriverSafety, in NEW
TO THE ROAD: REDUCING THE RISKS FOR YOUNG MOTORISTS 41, 44 (Herbert Simpson ed.,

1996); Shope, supra note 157, at il0; Williams, supra note 50, at i4.
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exhibit these risky driving behaviors to a greater extent than
179
young female drivers.
Studies have found the overwhelming majority of non-fatal
crashes involving young drivers result, not from intentional risktaking behaviors, but instead from failure to employ routine safe
driving practices and to recognize the inherent dangers of doing
so.' 8 0 One study of the crashes of newly licensed teen drivers
found that the factors most likely to contribute to the crashes
involved the driver failing to detect another vehicle or traffic
control, speeding, or losing control of the vehicle.' 8 ' A majority of
their crashes (about 60%) involved more than one contributing
82
factor.1
2. Contextual Influences on Adolescent Driving. The nature of
the driving task and the skills required for its safe execution both
depend on the specific context in which it occurs. For example,
drivers must respond appropriately to changing traffic and
roadway conditions, anticipate and react to other motorists'
actions, and contend with potential distractions within their own
In other words,
vehicles (both self- and passenger-generated).
"[s]afe driving is not only a matter of how well one drives, but how
one drives in the real world, which is hampered by complexities
18 3
and multiple contexts."'
Researchers have identified a number of contextual factors that
predictably influence young drivers' performance; this section
discusses the most significant of these.
3. Passengers, Older and Younger. Adolescent driving behavior
and crash risk vary tremendously depending on who is in the car
with them. 8 4 Driving with adult passengers has a protective

179

See C. Horvath et al., Peer Passenger Identity and Passenger Pressure on Young

Drivers' Speeding Intentions, 15 TRANSP. RES. PART F: TRAFFIC PSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 52, 54

(2011) (finding that young male drivers felt normative pressure to speed both when other
passengers were present and when driving alone).
180 McKnight & McKnight, supra note 43, at 924.
181 Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 52; see also Michael M. Gonzales et al., Student
Drivers:A Study of Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes Involving 16-Year-Old Drivers, 45 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 140, 140 (2005) (conducting a similar study of fatal crashes in Colorado
and obtaining similar results).
182 Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 52.
183 Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S274.
184 See Laird, supra note 40, at 313 (noting that adolescent crash rates vary depending on
the number, age, and gender of passengers).
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effect, and it is then that adolescent crash risk is at its lowest.18 5
Despite having less driving experience, learners driving under
adult supervision have much lower crash rates than do novice (i.e.,
unsupervised) drivers.18 6 Of sixteen-year-old drivers involved in
fatal crashes between 1994 and 1998, for instance, 86% held a
valid license, whereas 3% held a learner's permit.18 7 Indeed,
learners' crash risk approximates that of experienced adults.188
Researchers reason that adult passengers act as copilots of sorts,
offering advice and alerting the beginning driver to potential
dangers.189

When young drivers carry peer passengers, on the other hand,
adolescent crash and fatality rates are at their highest. 190 Younger
drivers are more likely to speed, exhibit risky driving behaviors,
drive while impaired, and fail to wear seatbelts when accompanied
by peer passengers.191 Their accident rates are substantially
higher than when they drive alone. 92 Their crash and fatality
rates are highest when driving with two or more teenage
193
passengers.
The sex of the teenaged passenger, moreover, correlates with
teen drivers' behavior. When the teen passenger is male, both
male and female teen drivers tend to drive more aggressively,

185

See Chris Lee & Mohamed Abdel-Aty, Presence of Passengers: Does it Increase or

Reduce Drivers' Crash Potential?, 40 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1703, 1703 (2008)
("[Clrash potential is reduced when middle-age passengers accompany teenage drivers as
guardians, whereas crash potential increases when teenage passengers accompany teenage
drivers.").
186 Mayhew et al., supra note 41, at 684. Mayhew and colleagues compared month-bymonth changes in the crash rates of learners (who hold a learner's permit) and novice
drivers (who hold a full license), and the monthly changes over a period of two years in
crash rates of young novice drivers (ages sixteen to nineteen) and older novice drivers (ages
twenty and older). Id.
187 Robert G. Ulmer et al., Teenage CrashReduction Associated with Delayed Licensure in
Connecticut, 32 J. SAFETY RES. 31, 32 (2001). There were 6,145 sixteen-year-old drivers
involved in fatal crashes during this period. Id.
18m Robert D. Foss, Improving Graduated Driver Licensing Systems: A
Conceptual
Approach and Its Implications, 38 J. SAFETY RES. 185, 187 (2007).
189 Allen & Brown, supra note 149, at S289.
190See Laird, supra note 40, at 313 (finding rates are highest when teen drivers carry two
or more teen passengers).
191Allen & Brown, supra note 149, at S289; Lee & Abdel-Aty, supra note 184, at 1703, 1708.
192 Laird, supra note 40, at 313.
193 Id.; Lee & Abdel-Aty, supra note 185, at 1704.
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following more closely behind other vehicles and driving above
194
posted speed limits.
Researchers analyzing the effects of carrying peer passengers
have categorized teen passenger influence into two broad typesproximal (or direct) and distal (or indirect). 195 The behaviors of
peer passengers in the vehicle are proximal influences and can
include distracting the driver, physically disrupting or interfering
196
with driving, or inciting the driver to engage in risky behaviors.
Even absent any explicit action on the part of peer passengers,
however, research suggests that the mere presence of peer
passengers influences young drivers. 197 This distal or indirect
influence of passengers seems to result from drivers' perceived
pressure to conform to in-group norms that establish group8
appropriate (but often risky) behavior.19
Most teenage passenger deaths occur when other teenagers are
driving. 199 Recent studies have found the death rate for teenage
passengers to be higher than for passengers of all other age groups
200
combined.
4. Time of Day. For motorists of all ages, driving at night,
20 1
especially after midnight, is riskier than driving during the day.
The nighttime crash risk is disproportionately high for young
drivers, however, and it is particularly elevated for sixteen- to
offer several
Researchers
drivers. 20 2
seventeen-year-old
explanations for the heightened dangers posed by nighttime
194 Laird, supra note 40, at 313 (citing Bruce Simons-Morton et al., The Observed Effects of
Teenage Passengers on the Risky Driving Behavior of Teenage Drivers, 37 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 973 (2005)); Lee & Abdel-Aty, supra note 185, at 1703. A British
study found that "[t]he presence of young female passengers was associated with safer
driving for young men, but the presence of young male passengers was associated with
dangerous driving (for example, higher speed, smaller following distance) for both young
male and young female drivers." Arnett, supranote 37, at iil8.
195 Laird, supra note 40, at 313.
196

Id.

197

Horvath et al., supra note 179, at 53.

198

Id.

199 INS. INST. HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1. In 2010, 59% of thirteen- to nineteen-yearold passengers killed died in vehicles driven by another teenager. Id.
20 Susan A. Ferguson et al., Progressin Teenage CrashRisk Duringthe Last Decade, 38 J.
SAFETY RES. 137, 141 (2007).
201 Sean T. Doherty et al., The Situational Risks of Young Drivers: The Influence of
Passengers, Time of Day and Day of Week on Accident Rates, 30 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &

PREVENTION 45, 45 (1998).
202

Williams & Preusser, supranote 128, at 335, 336 fig. 1.
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driving. First, darkness itself renders the driving task more
difficult. 20 3 Second, the types of teen social activities (such as
weekend parties) where drivers tend to carry peer passengers and
which correlate with impaired and risky driving occur more
frequently at night. 20 4 Finally, sleep deprivation, addressed next,
can contribute to increased nighttime driving risk.
5. Sleep Deprivation. Sleep deprivation (e.g., eighteen to
twenty-four hours of continuous wakefulness) has wide-ranging
effects that implicate driving. Fatigue caused by sleep deprivation
impairs attention, reaction time, judgment, and emotional
regulation-including increased anger and impulsivity-at levels
20 5
comparable to impairments caused by alcohol intoxication.
Among individuals suffering from moderate levels of sleep
deprivation, moreover, even very low amounts of alcohol can
20 6
impair performance.
Sleep deprivation is widespread among adolescents, who
typically sleep anywhere between one and three hours less than is
required by their natural sleep cycles. 20 7 Given the prevalence of
sleep deprivation among teens and the extent of its effects on
functioning, fatigue is unsurprisingly a nontrivial contributor to
teen crashes.20 8 Drivers aged eighteen and younger have by far
20 9
the highest rates of fatigue-related crashes of all age groups.
One researcher, emphasizing the effects of these overlapping
influences on young drivers, describes what is too common a
sequence: "the teenager who gradually accumulates a growing
sleep debt during the school week,... then goes out to a late-night
203

Id. at 336.

See id. ("[R]isky driving, generally associated with recreational activities, is more likely
to occur at night."). In general, however, alcohol-impaired driving is more common among
emerging adults than among teenaged drivers. Shope, supranote 157, at i10.
205 Ronald E. Dahl, Biological, Developmental, and NeurobehavioralFactors Relevant to
Adolescent Driving Risks, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED., at S278, S282-83 (Supp. 2008).
206 Id. at S283. Doses of alcohol less than 40 milligrams per 100 milliliters can compound
the effects of sleep deprivation. Id.
20? Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S274.
208 See Groeger, supra note 19, at i22 (noting that half of all teen crashes occur at night,
even though only 20% of teen driving occurs at night); Shope, supra note 157, at iAO ('Most
204

adolescents do not get enough sleep, and that sleep loss interferes with their functioning.").
209 Groeger, supra note 19, at i22 (reporting analysis of 2001-2002 Fatality Analysis
Reporting System traffic crash data). Emerging adult drivers aged nineteen to twenty-four
have the next-highest rates of fatigue-related crashes. Both groups have significantly
higher rates of fatigue-related crashes than all other age groups. 1d.
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party on Friday, and drives home under the combined influence of
to
sleep deprivation and alcohol." 210 He concludes, "It is difficult
211
risks."
driving
of
combination
imagine a more dangerous
B. COMPLEX PSYCHOMOTOR SKILLS: EXPERTISE THROUGH
EXPERIENCE

This section describes the skills required for driving competence
and the learning process required to acquire them. Real-world
driving is a complex psychomotor task, analogous in some ways to
continuous-action sports, such as basketball or hockey. 212 As with
other complex psychomotor skills, driving ability develops only
with the experience that comes with practice over an extended
21 3
period of time.
1. Basic Driving Skills vs. Real-World Driving Competence.
The typical novice can acquire the rudimentary elements of the
driving task-basic knowledge of traffic rules and vehicle-handling
skills such as starting, stopping, steering, and reversing a carwithin a matter of days, or even hours. 214 While basic knowledge
and maneuvering ability are certainly necessary for driving
competence, however, they are far from sufficient. 215 In addition to
basic vehicle-handling skills, driving requires a host of other skills,
such as regularly performing specific patterns of visual search;
identifying and interpreting a constantly changing external
environment; recognizing and both rapidly and appropriately
responding to potential hazards; and maintaining near-constant
attention to the driving task, irrespective of in-vehicle or external
2 16
distractions.
Novice drivers, deprived of the adult "copilots" who initially
supervised their driving as learners, encounter multiple situations

210

Dahl, supra note 205, at S283.

211

Id.

212
213

SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 9.
Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S273; SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS,

supra note 175, at 9; Waller, supra note 96, at 18.
214
215
216

SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 9.
Drummond, supra note 178, at 44; SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 9.
Groeger, supra note 19, at i20; Nils Petter Gregersen, What Should Be Taught? Basic

Vehicle Control Skills or Higher Order Skills?, in NEW TO THE ROAD: REDUCING THE RISKS
FOR YOUNG MOTORISTS 103, 104 (Herbert Simpson ed., 1996); SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG
DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 7, 9.
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that are new to them, and the tasks of processing and responding
to each of these situations demand significant cognitive
resources. 217 The novice must (1) engage a still-new perceptual
context, (2) within that context, handle a car that itself requires
the complex coordination of numerous controls, and (3) perform in
a manner that conforms to the many norms and rules of the traffic
218
environment.
With deliberate, effortful practice, the coordinated performance
of driving components becomes automated, and the demands on
cognitive resources lessen. 219 Because driving is cognitively
demanding for the inexperienced driver, however, distractions can
easily disrupt the driver's performance, which is already relatively
inconsistent. 220 More experienced drivers can drive safely even
while expending less cognitive effort, making their driving both
less susceptible to disruption by distraction and less variable. 221
2. The Role of Guided Practice. Guided practice facilitates
expertise development, and learning theorists stress its
importance during the process of skill acquisition. 222 Beginners
are unlikely to acquire expertise solely through unsupervised or
unstructured experience. Practice guided by experienced drivers
helps ensure that the beginning driver acquires desirable skills
and avoids acquiring undesirable skills or bad habits; just as
competent and safe driving skills can become automated, so too
223
can unsafe habits.
Learner-permit requirements that impose a supervised learning
stage on beginning drivers thus provide a structure in which they
may gain the guided experience needed to acquire driving skills.
Unlike short-term driver-education programs, learner-permit
requirements-provided they provide for sufficient periods of
practice and experience acquisition-can play a key role in
Gregersen, supra note 216, at 104.
Gregersen & Bjurulf, supra note 48, at 232.
219 Id.
Groeger emphasizes that "it is a lack of driving experience, not a lack of traffic
experience, that is important. People need to actually perform the activity repeatedly in
order to improve their performance. Being taught about it second hand, watching it, or
simply getting older does not yield the same-if any-improvement." Groeger, supra note
19, at i20.
220 Groeger, supra note 19, at i20.
221 Id.
222 Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at 8273.
217

218

223

Id.
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improving licensing safety. 224 Driver-education programs, traffic
safety experts now suggest, might at best be an effective way to
acquire initial basic driving skills. 225 But the Subcommittee on
Young Drivers of the Transportation Research Board estimated
that it currently takes eighteen to twenty-four months of
independent driving for novice drivers to accumulate the
226
experience required for driving competence.
The pattern of crash rates for all novice drivers starkly
illustrates the importance of actual driving experience. Crash
rates are highest in the first 250 miles of independent driving,
to
drop by almost two-thirds in the next 250 miles, and continue
227
decline modestly as independent driving experience increases.
This section has examined the importance of experience-which
can only occur over time-to acquiring driving competence. The
following section examines the importance of other regulatory and
decisionmaking capacities-which also can only occur over time as
development progresses-to acquiring driving competence.
C. THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY IMMATURITY

As discussed above, competent driving requires the effortful
acquisition of knowledge and skill. Competent and safe driving
also requires mature self-regulatory capacity-the ability to
control one's attention, emotions, and behavior across a variety of
social situations and contexts. 228 Regulatory competence involves
the ability to function (here, to maneuver a vehicle) proficiently in
224 Simpson, supra note 55, at 26. This research helps explain the failure of traditional
driver education courses, which can typically provide only basic car-handling instruction
and information on traffic laws and safe driving practices. "[I]n its present form," Professor
Patricia Waller has concluded, a driver education program "cannot produce a proficient
driver." Waller, supra note 96, at 18.
225 Williams, supra note 50, at i5. In one study, for example, novice drivers who received
the maximum training scored higher than the minimum training and control groups on an
on-road performance test. Id.
226 SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 9.
227 Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S273; see also Laird, supra note 40, at
311 (finding "very high crash rates during the first few months of independent driving that
decline rapidly for about 6 months and then more slowly for years"); McCartt et al., supra
note 42, at 311-12 (summarizing multiple studies coming to similar conclusions). A number
of studies have replicated these findings, including one of more than 40,000 novice drivers
that found that after two years, novice drivers' crash rates were 60% lower than during the
first month of full licensure and independent driving. Mayhew et al., supranote 41, at 684.
228 Dahl, supra note 205, at S278; Graham & Gootman, supra note 149, at S255.
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the face of challenging circumstances or major distractions. 229
These distractions may come from external sources (e.g.,
disruptive passengers), may be self-generated (e.g., texting or
eating while driving), or may be fully internal (e.g., mulling over a
230
perceived insult).
Both drivers whose inexperience demands they devote
significant cognitive resources to the driving task and drivers who
lack mature self-regulatory capacities are more susceptible to
231
distractions and the lapses in attention they may cause.
Failures of self-regulatory control can also make drivers more
vulnerable to unchecked emotion and the resulting impulsive
232
actions to which they may lead.
The development of regulatory competence is ongoing during
adolescence. The next two sections discuss relevant aspects of
adolescent cognitive and psychosocial development, including the
development of regulatory competence, first from the perspective
of behavioral psychology, then from the perspective of
developmental neuroscience.
It is only in recent years that
researchers, aided by technological developments in neuroimaging
techniques, have begun to better understand the neural correlates
of various aspects of adolescent behavior and of social and
cognitive changes seen to occur during development.233 Although
research in both fields is still developing, essential insights drawn
from each field support the conclusion that the underlying neural
systems that support and influence adolescents' development of
self-regulatory capacities are themselves still maturing throughout
the teen years. 234
And partly because this development is
229

Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S274.

230

Id.

Id.; Dahl, supra note 205, at S278.
See Dahl, supra note 205, at S278 ("[A]n impulsive action triggered by a strong emotion
can lead to deadly consequences in an automobile.").
233 Stephanie Burnett et al., The Social Brain in Adolescence: Evidence from Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Behavioural Studies, 35 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIoBEHAvIoRAL REVIEWS 1654, 1654-55 (2011). The advent of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) in particular has allowed scientists to observe brain activity
while individuals engage in specific tasks. Researchers can also use fMRI to compare
patterns of neural activity of different groups, such as children, adolescents, and adults.
See id. at 1655 (discussing several such studies). Structural magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) techniques have revealed ongoing neuroanatomical development during adolescence,
namely in regions of the brain associated with social cognition. Id. at 1660-61.
234 Dahl, supra note 205, at S278.
231

232
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dependent on normative physical/neurological processes, it is
resistant to change through external educational interventions or
other interventions.
1. Insights from Behavioral Psychology. Researchers who study
cognitive development have made two critical findings. First, by
mid-adolescence, individuals have the cognitive capacity to make
competent decisions. Second, certain contexts can hinder the
decisionmaking abilities that adolescents otherwise possess. 235
Cognitive capacity, including learning and reasoning from facts
and experience and information processing, improves more or less
linearly throughout childhood, reaching adult-like levels by midadolescence. 236 The reasoning and basic information-processing
capacities of the typical sixteen-year-old, according to researchers,
237
are essentially indistinguishable from those of adults.
Their mature abilities to learn and reason help explain
adolescents' driving-skill acquisition-i.e., their abilities to acquire
the knowledge and skills required for competent driving. They can
master the rules of driving and develop increasing levels of
expertise through accumulated experiences gained through
practice.
Despite adolescents' mature cognitive and reasoning abilities,
however, universal characteristics of adolescent behavior include
increased propensities for often-irrational impulsivity, risk-taking,
Early behavioral decision models
and sensation-seeking. 238
235 See B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 64, 68 (2008)
(noting that "adolescents are able to reason and understand risks of behaviors in which they
engage," but finding that individual differences in reward-related processing can exacerbate
developmental changes, making some teens more prone to engage in risky behavior); Geier
& Luna, supra note 23, at 218 (finding that adolescent brains differ from adult brains in
aspects of reward processing and cognitive control).
236 Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors'Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop," 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 590-92 (2009).
237 Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 80 (2008).
238 Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 218
(2009). Compared with adults over twenty-five, adolescents and young adults are more
likely to binge drink, commit crimes, engage in violence, have casual sex, and cause serious
or fatal automobile accidents. Steinberg, supra note 237, at 79.
Developmental scientists reason that evolutionary processes would have selected for
these characteristics, which presumably motivated adolescents (of all cultures and species)
to leave their natal environments and seek out mates. Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral
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attributed these behavioral characteristics to cognitive deficiencies
that caused adolescents to misperceive risks and to fail to
2 39
appreciate the long-term consequences of their decisions.
Studies, however, revealed no cognitive differences between
adolescents and adults that could explain their different
240
propensities for risk-taking.
Behavioral scientists thus reached the counterintuitive
conclusion that adolescents engage in higher rates of risky,
seemingly irrational behavior than do adults despite being as
"knowledgeable, logical, reality-based, and accurate in the ways in
which they think about risky activity ...as their elders. 24 '
Cognitive deficiencies do not account for adolescents' propensity
for risky and impulsive decisionmaking. 242 Researchers have
endeavored to determine why adolescents nonetheless frequently
make irrational,risky decisions.
Behavioral scientists examined more closely the real-world
contexts 243 in which adolescents make decisions, gaining valuable
insights into adolescent decisionmaking processes. 244 Their findings
confirmed adolescents' competence to make rational decisions-at
least when making decisions in the artificial conditions of the
research laboratories in which they complete tasks involving minor,
The real-world contexts-including driving
symbolic risks. 245
which
adolescents make decisions, however, can
contexts-in
246
drastically affect the quality of their decisionmaking.
Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160,
161 (2010).
239 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making:
Implicationsfor Theory, Practice,and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1, 33 (2006).
240 Steinberg, supra note 237, at 80.
241
242

Id.
Id.

243 Behavioral scientists define a "context [as] a culturally defined situation that (a) occurs
in a particular time and place and (b) contains actors who perform culturally defined roles."
James P. Byrnes, The Development of Self-Regulated Decision Making, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 5, 7
(Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005).
244 See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 100 (recommending such a change in focus).
245 See id. at 80 (finding few, if any, age-related differences in lab studies on evaluation of
risk); Reyna & Farley, supra note 239, at 2 (criticizing lab tests for failing to account for
real-world conditions).
246 Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference,
and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625 (2005); Reyna & Farley, supra note 239, at 12.
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When decisionmaking contexts involve stressors that require the
exercise of psychosocial maturity and regulatory competencerequiring that a decision be made in an unfamiliar situation (such
as the new perceptual situations involved in driving); under time
pressure (such as the nearly instantaneous reactions often required
when reacting to driving hazards); in an emotionally charged
situation or in the heat of passion; or in the presence or under the
influence of peers (including the direct or distal influence of peer
247
passengers)-adolescent decisionmaking suffers.
Emerging research in the neurosciences helps explain why
248
decisionmaking context matters.
Insights from the Developmental Neurosciences.
2.
have begun developing a
Developmental neuroscientists
has
the potential to explain the
that
model
neurologically-based
risk-taking, poor
in adolescents'
simultaneous increases
decisionmaking, and general lack of self-regulatory control on the
one hand, and improved cognitive ability on the other.249 The
Cognitive researchers refer to this as the "competence-performance distinction." Jennifer L.
Woolard et al., Theoretical and MethodologicalIssues in Studying Children's Capacities in
Legal Contexts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996). Consistent with these observations,
studies demonstrate that not all cognitive processes mature by mid-adolescence. Some
processes, such as certain aspects of working memory and response inhibition, continue to
specialize and develop into adulthood. Beatriz Luna et al., What Has fMRI Told Us About
the Development of Cognitive Control Through Adolescence?, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 101,
105 (2010) (suggesting that all components of working memory mature by the early
twenties). Working memory and response inhibition are involved in the voluntary control of
behavior (including the ability to filter irrelevant information and suppress inappropriate
actions) and other complex mental abilities. Id. at 101.
247 Reyna & Farley, supra note 239, at 12; Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 246, at 625.
248 See generally Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Is the Teen Brain Too Rational?, 17
Sci. AM. SPECIAL EDITION, June 2007, at 60 (summarizing research on teen decisionmaking
regarding risky behaviors like sex and drinking, and recommending intervention programs
based on more intuitive "gist-based" reasoning). Even though they do not generally
misperceive risks (if anything, studies tend to show that adolescents and adults both
overestimate risk), adolescents tend to weigh and value benefits more heavily than risks, as
compared to adults. Reyna & Farley, supranote 239, at 6. Researchers advance a number
of theories to explain this, some related to cognition and others grounded in neural
See Baruch Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent Decision-Making
development itself.
Competence, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 12, at 19-20 (2008) (listing cognitive factors that
might contribute to teens' poor risk/benefit assessment); Geier & Luna, supra note 23, at
213 (attributing sensation-seeking in teens to immature brain circuitry).
249 See Casey et al., supra note 235, at 63 (discussing cognitive and neurobiological
hypotheses that fail to adequately account for adolescent decisionmaking behavior).
Developmental psychologist Laurence Steinberg recently emphasized the importance-to all
disciplines within developmental science-of research in developmental neuroscience,

1060

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 48:1019

model is primarily oriented around development in two neural
systems of the brain-the system associated with cognitive control,
and the one associated with socio-emotional maturity, which
250
includes self-regulatory capacities.
The core insight of this dual-systems model is that these two
neural systems develop along different timelines. 251 This temporal
disjunction has the potential to explain adolescents' risk-taking
and poor decisionmaking despite their improved cognitive ability,
252
as well as other aspects of adolescent psychology and behavior.
The socio-emotional system within the dual-systems model
includes neural circuitries across regions of the brain implicated in
social
information-processing
and
reward-seeking
and
processing. 25 3 Activity in certain neural reward systems peaks
rapidly and dramatically in early adolescence, around the time of
pubertal maturation, then declines. 25 4 Researchers believe that

suggesting that this research has the "potential to structure a new, overarching model of
normative... adolescent development." Steinberg, supra note 238, at 162. See generally
Steinberg, supra note 237 (proposing a framework for theory and research informed by
developmental neuroscience). See also Burnett et al., supra note 233, at 1660 (summarizing
broadly compatible models).
250 See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 83 (framing adolescent risk-taking in terms of
changes in the brain's "socio-emotional system" and its "cognitive control system").
251 See id. at 97-98 ("[B]asic intellectual abilities reach adult levels around age 16, long
before the process of psychosocial maturation is complete .... "); Laurence Steinberg et al.,
Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and SelfReport: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764
(2008) ("Neurobiological evidence in support of the dual systems model is rapidly
accumulating.").
252 See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text. For slightly different accounts of the
dual-systems model, see Casey et al., supra note 235, at 63-64 (describing the model in
terms of development of specific areas in the brain); Geier & Luna, supra note 23, at 213
(describing the model in terms of cognitive control and incentive processing systems); and
Catherine Sebastian et al., Social Brain Development and the Affective Consequences of
Ostracism in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 134, 138 (2010) (discussing aspects of the
dual-systems model).
253 See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 83 (noting that the socio-emotional system includes
the "amygdala, nucleus accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and
superior temporal sulcus").
254 See Geier & Luna, supra note 23, at 216-17 (discussing developmental changes in
dopamine systems); Steinberg et al., supra note 251, at 1764-66 ("[A]dolescent risk taking
is hypothesized to be stimulated by a rapid and dramatic increase in dopaminergic activity
within the socioemotional system around the time of puberty...."). For a more detailed
discussion of key aspects of this aspect of brain development, see CHARLES A. NELSON ET
AL., NEUROSCIENCE OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE

DEVELOPING BRAIN 24 (2006).
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this peak in activity makes adolescents experience potentially
rewarding stimuli as even more rewarding than during either
childhood or adulthood. 255 The resulting heightening of reward
salience leads to increased sensation-seeking-a "tendency to seek
out novel, varied, and highly stimulating experiences, [coupled
with a] willingness to take risks in order to attain them. 25 6
For young drivers, strongly desirable sensations associated with
driving include excitement, power, and increased status among
peers. 257 A propensity for sensation-seeking has consistently been
25 8
associated with risky driving, traffic violations, and car crashes.
The second neural system in the dual-systems model is the
cognitive control system. Cognitive control refers to the abilities to
259
voluntarily coordinate and engage in goal-directed behavior.
The cognitive control system follows a more gradual and linear
developmental trajectory than does the socio-emotional system
and, along with other structural changes in the brain, correlates
260
with the maturation of basic cognitive processes by age sixteen.
Other structural changes that increase connections within and
between different regions of the brain correlate with behavioral
improvements in higher-order and executive functions (such as

255 See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 85 (theorizing that this is caused by a temporary lack
of "buffering capacity" in dopamine release systems).
256 Steinberg et al., supra note 251, at 1765.
257 See Bridie Scott-Parker et al., The Influence of Sensitivity to Reward and Punishment,
Propensityfor Sensation Seeking, Depression, and Anxiety on the Risky Behaviour of Novice
Drivers:A PathModel, 103 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 248, 250-51 (2012) (citing reported studies).
258 Id. at 251.
259 Luna et al., supra note 246, at 101. This system includes the prefrontal cortex, which
is involved in executive, decisionmaking, and self-regulatory functions, and "association'
areas, which connect different regions of the brain and thus support the complex integration
of functions. See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 93-94 (describing the effects of maturation
of the prefrontal and parietal association cortices). The cognitive control system also
includes parts of the corpus callosum, which connects the left and right hemispheres.
Beatriz Luna, Developmental Changes in Cognitive Control Through Adolescence, in 37
ADVANCES IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 233, 240 (Patricia Bauer ed., 2009).
260 See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 93-95 (describing specific structural developments in
the cognitive control system). For more detailed descriptions of these structural changes,
see Nitin Gogtay & Paul M. Thompson, Mapping Gray Matter Development: Implications for
Typical Development and Vulnerability to Psychopathology, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 6, 7
(2010); Tomas Paus, Mapping Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During
Adolescence, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 60, 62 (2005); and Arthur W. Toga et al., Mapping
BrainMaturation, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 148, 149-50 (2006).
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response inhibition, planning, spatial working memory, etc.). 26 1
Increased connectivity between regions involved in social and
emotional information processing, and those involved in cognitive
control processes correlates with the coordination of affect (the
external expression of emotions) and cognition. 262
Strategic
planning, anticipation of future consequences, and resistance to
neutral (as opposed to antisocial) peer influence and peer influence
in general all follow the same trajectory, increasing linearly from
26 3
preadolescence through late adolescence and early adulthood.
In summary, adolescents' basic cognitive abilities are mature by
age sixteen, giving them the capacity to reason, learn, process
information, and make the rational decisions required to acquire
basic driving knowledge and skills. But their susceptibility to the
confounding influence of heightened sensitivity to reward
increases and peaks around mid-adolescence, inclining young
people towards risk-taking, sensation-seeking, and impulsivityall elements of the immature development of self-regulatory
capacities. This lack of regulatory competence may dominate or
overwhelm cognitive processes and shape adolescent behaviors,
especially in pressured situations or those triggering heightened
emotion. 264
The emotional regulation and impulse control
necessary for safe driving both improve through adolescence and
into the mid-twenties. 265
261

See Steinberg, supra note 237, at 94-96 (describing the effects of increases in white

brain matter in certain regions of the brain).
262 See id. at 95-96 (suggesting that adolescents' brains may, less likely than those of
adults, activate multiple cortical and subcortical areas simultaneously in response to
emotional stimuli, resulting in a deficit in synchronization of affect and cognition).
263 See id. at 94 (finding that some of these functions showed continued improvement
through age eighteen, and others continued to improve into the early twenties); Sindy R.
Sumter et al., The Developmental Pattern of Resistance to Peer Influence in Adolescence:
Will the Teenager Ever Be Able to Resist?, 32 J. ADOLESCENCE 1009, 1016 (reporting "a
steady increase in resistance to general peer influence with age"). See generally Luna et al.,
supra note 246 (examining fMRI studies to track the development of different brain
functions through adolescence).
264 See Luna, supra note 259, at 257 (concluding that though "inhibitory processes are
available by childhood... the ability to flexibly and consistently execute control continues
to improve through adolescence'); Steinberg, supra note 237, at 96-98 ("This lack of crosstalk across brain regions results not only in individuals acting on gut feelings without fully
thinking... but also in thinking too much when one's gut feelings ought to be attended
to ....
").
265 Luna, supra note 259, at 257; Steinberg, supra note 237, at 97-98 (finding that the
process of psychosocial maturation is not complete until "well into the young adult years").
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Research into the adolescent brain thus supports the consistent
findings of cognitive psychologists that "age (or rather
youthfulness) and driving inexperience contribute independently
to crash involvement .... The catastrophically higher crash
likelihood of teenage drivers stems from their lack of driving
266
experience and their lack of age."
D. UNALTERABLE RISK: THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF INEXPERIENCE
AND NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES

The combined effects of inexperience and immature selfregulatory capacity can result in driving behavior that leads to
potentially serious, or even fatal, consequences. 267 Professor
Jeffrey Arnett, whose study of adolescence was cited by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons,268 points out that sixteenyear-olds are at a "markedly different stage of adolescent
development" than are eighteen-year-olds. 269 By ages fifteen or
sixteen, adolescents indeed have the cognitive ability required to
learn traffic rules and basic driving skills. As do all beginners,
they must acquire the competence that comes only with practice in
a variety of situations-which requires as much as eighteen to
twenty-four months of driving experience.27 0 This experience, and
the time and practice required to acquire it, are thus essential if
the novice driver is to develop true expertise.
The importance of skill acquisition, and the extended process
required to acquire it, may explain the belief of many
policymakers, practitioners, and even researchers new to the field
that better education and training-leading to more rapid
improvement in adolescents' driving skills-might be the solution
to the young driver problem. 27 1 The Transportation Research

266
267

Groeger, supra note 19, at i19.
Dahl, supra note 205, at S278.
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (holding unconstitutional

26
the imposition of capital
punishment on juveniles younger than eighteen).
269 Williams, supra note 50, at i4 (citing Arnett, supra note 37, at iil7-ii23).
270 See supra note 226 and accompanying text. "Some of the factors contributing to a large
proportion of novice teenage drivers' crashes (for example, difficulty navigating slippery
roads, not looking thoroughly at other vehicles or traffic controls) point to the importance of
teenagers obtaining adequate amounts of practice driving in a variety of situations."
Braitman et al., supra note 2, at 52.
271 SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 7.
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Board's Subcommittee on Young Drivers soundly rejected this
view, explaining that those who hold it base it on another
"commonly held, but mistaken, view-that the majority of
adolescents are sufficiently mature and that their primary crash
risk factor is driving inexperience." 272 Empirical data comparing
the crash rates of younger and older novices 273 and research in
adolescent development 274 convincingly demonstrate otherwise.
Driving inexperience, as noted above, is not the overriding, or
even primary, cause of adolescent crash risk. At younger driver
ages-i.e., fifteen to seventeen-inexperience is secondary to
developmental immaturity; not until later ages do different levels
of driving experience account for more of the differences in crash
27 5
rates.
The self-regulatory capacities essential to competent and safe
driving are still immature in adolescence, as observed in research
of adolescent behavior generally and driving behavior specifically,
and supported by research of the adolescent brain.2 7 6 Incomplete,
ongoing development of the capacities required to regulate
behavior and emotions, impairment of decisionmaking abilities in
pressured situations, and inclination towards risk-taking behavior
are all characteristics typical of adolescence-and all confound the
successful execution of the nascent driving competence adolescents
do possess.
IV. PROPOSED RESPONSES, LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL
Despite more than a decade of varied legislative efforts, sixteenand seventeen-year-olds continue to have the highest crash rates
of all drivers, and motor vehicle crashes continue to be the leading
cause of their deaths.2 77 Existing measures, even those having
some positive effects, insufficiently safeguard both young drivers
and the public at large from young drivers' immaturity and
inexperience.2 78 Instead, "the sheer magnitude of the injuries and
272

Id.

See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part IlI.C.
275 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Parts III.C.1-2.
277 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 19.
278 Ild.
273
274
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fatalities that continue to result from teen crashes" alone,
according to the 2007 report of the National Academies'
interdisciplinary workshop, "shows that current prevention efforts
279
are inadequate."
If future regulatory efforts are to accomplish what past efforts
have not, lawmakers considering how to approach the serious
public health problem posed by young drivers must take account of
"the complexity of the driving task, the nature of adolescent
behavior, and how features of adolescent development can interact
280
with driving inexperience to heighten crash risk."

Part II delineated the nature of the public health problem that
is adolescent driving, including current regulatory and sociocultural contexts that shape it. Part III gathered and interrelated
cross-disciplinary research to explain the intrapersonal and
interpersonal factors that affect adolescent driving.
This final Part derives from the first two a set of legal proposals
to address this public health issue, guided by the basic ends of the
liberal state and its obligations to its immature citizens and
accounting for the liberty interests of those citizens themselves. It
argues that the severity of the young driver problem and its roots
in unalterable developmental characteristics of adolescence point
to a set of regulatory reforms capable of effectively eliminating
adolescent crash risk-simultaneously (1) lowering the age of
learner's licensure and (2) raising the ages of provisional and full
licensure. Traffic safety researchers and lawmakers alike largely
avoid pressing this reform, presumably for political reasons. This
Part argues for evidence-based advocacy to help overcome these
281
political hurdles.
It next suggests a number of (second-best) intermediate
measures the passage of which, along with many of the reforms
already enacted by the states, would likely further reduce crash
and fatality risks for teen drivers.
Finally, it explains that all of these suggested measures-from
the most far-reaching to the slightest-easily fall within the
purview of state and federal regulatory authority and comport
NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
280 SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 7.
279

281 See Graham & Gootman, supra note 149, at S255 (discussing the importance of
evidence-based advocacy in the context of teen driving issues).
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with current constitutional protections afforded both young people
and their parents.
A. THE LIBERAL STATE'S ENDS, IMMATURE CITIZENS' INTERESTS

In previous work, I have argued that even immature citizens
have a minimum basic entitlement to liberty, and described the

nature of the state's duty to guarantee

it.282

Especially relevant to

the state's decisionmaking in the context of adolescent driving,
however, is the importance of the state's identifying the interests
of the young-which change dramatically as they develop to
maturity-and considering them in its decisionmaking.
The young have two basic categories of interests: welfare
interests and autonomy interests. 2 3 Their welfare interests
pertain to their well-being, irrespective of any choice they might
make. 28 4 Among their welfare interests are an interest in
acquiring the prerequisites necessary to attain their mature
capacities, and an interest in being protected from their own
deficiencies. 2 5 Their autonomy interests include making selfdetermining choices and having the liberty to exercise the liberties
28 6
of which they are capable.
The state thus owes its immature citizens its best effort to
determine, and extend to them, those liberties they are capable of
exercising. It also owes them, however, its best effort to restrain
them from exercising liberties that exceed their capacities, and is
particularly justified in doing so when their bad decisions harm
not only the immature citizens themselves, but others as well.
In light of the evidence presented above, the state's primary
obligation with respect to adolescent drivers is to protect themand other members of society-from their deficiencies.
Its
secondary obligation is to facilitate their acquiring the ability to
competently exercise what is, to many citizens, an important
liberty.
282 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055,
1076-82 (arguing that the state owes duties to its immature citizens both as citizens who
happen to be immature and as citizens who will be mature in the future).

283
284
285
286

Id. at 1095.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATING ADOLESCENT CRASH RISK

Allan Williams and colleague David Preusser, each of whom has
completed more than two decades of highly regarded research in
traffic and highway safety, have concluded that "[o]ne way to
address the resulting young driver problem would be to follow the
Europeans and simply delay driver licensing until adolescent
development is largely complete." 28 7 They go on to reject this
approach, however, perceiving two barriers to its success-"[(1)]
the need to accumulate driving experience and [(2)] the need for
mobility, especially in suburban and rural areas." 28 8 Although the
costs of raising the age of licensure should be balanced against any
gains in road safety, Williams and Preusser arguably overstate the
extent to which sixteen- and seventeen-year-old licensure serves a
social function so critical that its loss outweighs the gains in safety
achieved by delaying that licensure.
This section proposes (1) lowering the age of learner's licensure
in order to facilitate young drivers' accumulation of significant
driving experience prior to unsupervised driving, and (2) raising
the age of unsupervised licensure (both provisional and full) to
counteract the effects of developmental immaturity on young
drivers' crash risk.
1. Lowering the Age of Learner's Licensure. Inexperience and
lack of driving skill contribute to the heightened crash risk of
novice drivers. 28 9 The driving experience-and increased skillacquired by adolescents during mandatory learner's periods
partially account for the success of licensing systems that impose
290
those requirements.
Researchers have been working to develop improved driver
education and training methods (e.g., computer-based instruction)
to make the process of skill-acquisition faster and less risky, but
they admit that "there is presently little evidence that any kind of
education or training other than 'just driving,' effectively reduces
Acquiring experience thus takes time, but
crash rates."291
evidence suggests that it is time well spent. As Professor Waller
287 Williams & Preusser, supra note 128, at 335.
288

Id.

289 See supra Part II.A.3.

290 See supra Part II.B.3.
291Foss, supra note 188, at 186.
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noted, "practice that occurs over time, that is, distributed practice,
results in better learning than practice that occurs all at
once. ... Early acquisition of driving skill should occur over an
292
extended period."
Adolescents should thus begin the process of driving-skill
acquisition as early as is practicable, but only under the conditions
demonstrated to carry the lowest possible risk (outside of a
293
simulated environment)-i.e., with adult supervision.
By ages fifteen or sixteen, adolescents' cognitive capacities are
comparable to those of adults, and they are able to learn the rules
governing driving and acquire basic driving skills. 294 For young
beginning drivers, driving under adult supervision is safe; whereas
the crash rates for all novice (unsupervised) drivers are highest in
the first months of independent driving, very few learner driverswho overwhelmingly have less driving experience than do
novices-crash while driving with adult supervising passengers. 295
When crashes involving learner's permit holders do occur, they
typically involve learners driving unsupervised, in violation of
296
permit requirements.
The safety benefits of an extended period of learner's licensure,
moreover, have found empirical support. In Sweden, for example,
the age of full licensure has long been eighteen. 297 The age of
learner's licensure was lowered in 1993, however, from seventeen
and a half to sixteen. 298 Studies found that drivers who obtained
learner's permits at age sixteen accumulated more hours of
supervised practice (without any pre-licensure increase in crash

Waller,supranote 96, at 18.
See supra Part III.A.3.
294 See supra Part III.C.
295 Mayhew et al., supra note 41, at 684; see also Williams & Tison, supra note 5, at 147
(studying fatal crash data for thirteen- to fifteen-year-old drivers and finding that
"[]earners with an adult passenger stood out as having the most favorable crash profile").
29 Hedlund et al., supra note 97, at 110.
297 See Waller et al., supra note 5, at 117 (implying that Sweden's age for full licensure
was eighteen prior to 1993).
298 Id. (citing Nils Petter Gregersen et al., Sixteen Years Age Limit for Learner Drivers in
Sweden-An Evaluation of Safety Effects, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 25 (2000));
see also Lawrence P. Lonero, Trends in Driver Education and Training, 35 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. S316, S318 (Supp. 2008) (noting the "positive safety results in Sweden"
after the change).
292
293
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risk), and had a 35% decrease in crash risk upon acquiring full
299
licensure at age eighteen.
In the United States, it is likely that providing for as long a
period of supervised driving practice as is feasible will result in
corresponding gains in experience and subsequently reduce crash
risk upon the acquisition of unsupervised licensure. It is also
possible that lowering or maintaining the age of learner's
licensure-to between fourteen and sixteen-may have the
political benefit of providing young people with a tangible sense of
progress towards full licensure.
2. Raising the Age of Provisional and Full Licensure. The
United States is an early licensing country-indeed, the earliest
licensing country in the developed world. 300 The adoption of age
sixteen as the presumptive norm reflects both arbitrary convention
and historical factors (i.e., the needs of agricultural communities)
that no longer justify early licensure. 3 1 Delaying unsupervised
licensure can significantly diminish the effect of age-related
30 2
developmental factors that contribute to adolescent crash risk.
The younger the age at which a driver becomes licensed, the
higher the crash (and fatal crash) risk. Because inexperience is a
factor, lowering the age of learner's licensure and extending this
supervised learner's stage, as I propose above, can help reduce the
crash risk of younger drivers by providing for more practice and
driving experience pre-licensure. Studies suggest, however, that
age-related
developmental characteristics
contribute most
significantly to crash risk at the younger licensing ages.30 3 In
other words, practice hours may somewhat reduce but cannot
overcome the risks posed by developmental immaturity.
The major contributor to crash reduction attributable to GDL
systems is the delay in licensure that tends to accompany those
licensing systems. 30 4 Higher minimum ages for acquiring a
learner's permit, minimum permit-holding periods, and minimum
practice-hour requirements all tend to delay the age at which
299

Waller et al., supranote 5, at 117-18.

300 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
301 See Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 17-18 (suggesting that these factors explain why
the minimum age in the United States is lower than that of other developed nations).
302 Williams, supra note 50, at i4.
303 Id.

304 McCartt et al., supra note 114, at 698.
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teens become licensed. 305
States whose GDL systems have
resulted in delays in licensure have generally seen the largest
crash reductions among young drivers. 306 Under these systems,
younger, less mature drivers, the most crash-prone, have less
unsupervised driving exposure (i.e., they spend fewer hours on the
road). The result is a predictable reduction in crashes. 307 While
the primary purpose of graduated licensing requirements has been
to provide beginners with experience in low-risk situations, there
is evidence suggesting "that when the effects of differences in the
minimum learner's permit and licensing ages are accounted for, no
further significant benefits are gained from the minimum holding
period or minimum practice hours requirements." 308
Thus, those licensing provisions that operate to raise the age of
licensure-even by requiring, for example, that a sixteen-year-old
hold a learner's permit for six or eight months before applying for
a higher level of licensure-indirectly effectuate at least part of the
crash reduction that raising the minimum licensing age would
effectuate directly.
Studies suggest that even slight age differences in the
adolescent years can have measurable effects. Early studies of the
effects of New Jersey's age-seventeen licensing law associated it
with reductions between 65% and 85% in sixteen-year-old crash
involvement. 30 9 Some of the reduction in driver crash involvement
was offset by higher crash involvement of seventeen-year-old
drivers, which seemed compatible with driver inexperience. 310
305 See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (noting that GDL programs
"prolong the time it takes to become fully licensed"); Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at
S326 (arguing that the safety benefits of GDL programs come primarily from "licensure
delay").
306 See Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S326 (finding evidence that GDL systems
that combine extended learner periods with nighttime and passenger restrictions see the
greatest crash reductions, and arguing that the extended learner period, achieved primarily
through licensure delay, is the biggest contributing factor).
307 Id. See generally Anne T. McCartt et al., New Jersey's License Plate Decal Requirement
for GraduatedDriver Licenses: Attitudes of Parents and Teenagers, Observed Decal Use, and
Citations for Teenage Driving Violations, 14 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 244 (2013).
308 McCartt et al., supra note 110, at 245.
309 Allan F. Williams et al., Variations in Minimum Licensing Age and Fatal Motor
Vehicle Crashes, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1401, 1402 (1983).
310 Id. at 1402-03. Despite the increased crash involvement of seventeen-year-olds, the
net effect of the New Jersey law is, according to researchers, "strongly positive." Id. at
1403.
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Recent proposals predict, however, that a licensing system that
both delays licensure to age seventeen and implements elements of
GDL provisions would lead to major reductions in young drivers'
311
crashes.
Ideally, then, states would permit provisional licensure that
allows for unsupervised driving under sharply curtailed
circumstances no earlier than age seventeen, but preferably age
eighteen. The age of full licensure would be increased to age
eighteen or nineteen.
C. REDUCING ADOLESCENT CRASH RISK

Short of (or in addition to) reducing the age for and extending
the duration of learner's licensure and raising the ages of
provisional and full licensure, other measures may help reduce the
crash risk of young drivers. Institutional- and sociocultural-level
reforms can account for, and may positively influence, the
behaviors that contribute to adolescent driving risk.
1. Institutional and Legal Reforms. The restrictions imposed
on provisional-license holders succeed in large part by protecting
adolescents from the harmful effects of deficiencies in their
regulatory capacities and driving skills. 312 Additional restrictions
may provide further protective benefits. These restrictions might
include prohibitions on handheld or hands-free devices (preventing
313
cell phone use, texting, etc.) or other distractions.
In response to the overwhelming evidence of the negative effect
of peer passengers, all but three states have enacted some form of
passenger restriction on young drivers. 314 While regulations
restricting new teenage drivers have been effective in reducing
crashes involving peer passengers, their effectiveness has been
limited by teenage drivers' well-documented and common
noncompliance with the restrictions. 315 Increased enforcement and

See McCartt et al., supranote 110, at 245-46.
Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supranote 156, at S274 (suggesting that GDL restrictions
that address these concerns are "likely to help adolescents acquire and solidify driving
skills").
313 Id.
314 Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS'N (June
2014), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/license-laws.html.
315 Williams & Tison, supra note 5, at 148; Lee & Abdel-Aty, supra note 185, at 1703.
311

312
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mechanisms that facilitate their enforcement are needed. An
example of one such enforcement mechanism is the New Jersey
requirement-recently upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court
against constitutional challenge-that all drivers under age
twenty-one display highly visible decals on their vehicles. 316
Given high nighttime and fatigue-related crash rates, most
states have imposed nighttime driving restrictions on teenage
drivers. 317 Cognitive psychologist John Groeger has observed that
nighttime driving restrictions may lessen some portion of the
increased risk, but because adolescents are equally fatigued in the
morning hours (and often throughout the day), nighttime
restrictions can only partially resolve adolescent fatigue-related
driving risk. 318
Additional reforms aimed at reducing both
adolescent fatigue and the driving exposure of overly fatigued
adolescents (some more difficult than others to implement) might
include beginning the school day at a later time,3 19 increasing the
availability of public and school-provided transportation, and
discouraging teens from driving to school by making student
parking inconvenient or altogether unavailable.
2. Extralegal and Social Interventions. As discussed above,
popular culture promotes skillful, daring, fast drivingparticularly for males.3 20 "[P]eers are the primary mediators of
cultural
attitudes
toward
safe
driving
versus
risky
driving.... Clearly, efforts are needed to reshape and
reemphasize teen driving, such that safe rather than risky driving
321
is seen as the norm."
Both government and private entities have implemented
various social and behavioral interventions in an attempt to
reduce teens' risky driving.
Safe-driving public service
announcements (PSAs) are an example of such antecedent
interventions. 322 There has been little research on the impact of

Trautmann ex rel. Trautmann v. Christie, 48 A.3d 1005, 1007 (N.J. 2012) (per curiam).
McCartt et al., supra note 114, at 698.
318 See Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S274 (citing Groeger, supra note 19).
316
317

319 Id.

See supra Part H.c.
Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S276.
322 Researchers
have developed a more sophisticated understanding of certain
characteristics that enhance the influence of the antecedent messages. For a discussion of
320
321
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PSAs, with assessments generally showing them to be ineffective
or only marginally effective. 323 When they do demonstrate positive
results, moreover, benefits tend to last only as long as the PSA
intervention itself. For example, one 4.5-month multimedia
traffic-safety
campaign that targeted young drivers in
northeastern Tennessee correlated with a 21.6% decrease in atfault crashes of sixteen- to nineteen year-old-drivers (a control
location elsewhere in the state showed no decrease in crashes), but
the decrease lasted only for the duration of the PSA campaign
itself. 324 The authors of the study noted that, even though the
decrease in crash rate was significant, the common problem of
"posttreatment behavior maintenance" limited its long-term
325
efficacy.
Researchers have also identified factors that may contribute to
gender differences in risky driving and crash risk. Some have
suggested that the higher levels of testosterone present in male
midteens (twenty times higher than prepubescent levels) increase
aggressive behavior generally, including aggressive driving.326
Males also have higher sensation-seeking tendencies than females,
327
which potentially contributes to their risky driving behavior.
Other researchers argue that socialization and conformity with
gender norms are more significant factors. 328 These researchers
argue that, even in the presence of high levels of testosterone,

these, see Kimberly P. Whittam et al., Effectiveness of a Media Campaign to Reduce Traffic
CrashesInvolving Young Drivers, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 614, 615 (2006).
323 Id. at 615.
324 Id. at 624. The campaign's theme was "What's the Hurry?" and included two thirtysecond television announcements, two corresponding radio announcements, and a billboard
display. Id. at 617-18.
325 Id. at 624-25.
326 E.g., Arnett, supra note 37, at ii19. Female adolescents also experience elevated levels
of testosterone, but it is a relatively modest increase compared to that experienced by
males. Id.
321 Julien Cestac et al., Young Drivers' Sensation Seeking, Subjective Norms, and
Perceived Behavioral Control and Their Roles in Predicting Speeding Intention: How RiskTaking Motivations Evolve with Gender and Driving Experience, 49 SAFETY SCI. 424, 430
(2011). Cestac and co-authors conducted a study in France, concluding that men seem to
perceive more social pressure to speed than do women. Id.
328 See Sibley & Harr6, supra note 93, at 458-59 (proposing a "gender role socialization
model" of driving self-enhancement); Cestac et al., supra note 327, at 431 (concluding that
social comparison plays the predominant role in the speeding intention of drivers who have
held their licenses for one to three years).
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emerging research... suggest[s] that high levels of
male hormones are associated with aggression only
when aggression is a socially endorsed route to
dominance.... [R]isky driving is still only part of the
masculine package because society has put it there,
and there is no reason to believe that it cannot be
329
replaced with a more constructive norm.
Since popular culture and society in general associate risky
driving with male identity, researchers have urged taking steps to
undermine these associations and replace them with others (such
as pairing masculinity with "responsible" rather than "skillful" or
"daring" driving).33° They acknowledge the difficulty in dislocating
ingrained and widespread cultural practices. 331 As sites in which
to begin these sorts of efforts, though, they suggest public
332
advertising and incorporating them into school curricula.
D. POLITICAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES

The regulatory systems implemented to govern teen licensure
aim to increase public safety by reducing teen crash risk, but their
effects can be far-reaching and trigger a wide range of concerns.
For example, licensure regulations implicate the appropriate
balance between federal- and state-level legal responses with
which public health law grapples; their requirements and
restrictions can alter the rights of parents, whose entitlement to
direct their children's upbringing and presumptive status as
protectors of their adolescent children's well-being receives
constitutional protection; and of course for young people
themselves, these regulatory systems determine whether and the
circumstances under which they will exercise the driving privilege,
which has taken on considerable cultural significance and serves
333
useful (some would argue, vital) economic and social functions.
This section first identifies two political hurdles to enacting
licensure reform. It argues that the first-political inattention-is
329

Sibley & Harr6, supranote 93, at 460.

330 Id.

331 Id.
332

Id.

s3 See supra Part IV. B-C.
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under-acknowledged by those working in the field, whereas the
second-widespread popular resistance-is overstated.
The
and
scope
of
legal
authority
briefly
to
the
nature
section next turns
respectively granted state and federal governments to legislate in
Finally, it addresses the rights and interests of
this area.
adolescents and their parents, who will be most directly and
immediately affected by regulatory reform.
1. Political Hurdles. Despite the impact of adolescent driving
on public welfare and the inadequacy of current regulatory
structures, research by those who study adolescent development
and health risk behavior has come slowly. 33 4 Government support
of such research has come even more slowly. From 1972 to 2008,
for example, there were 314 federally funded studies of adolescents
and substance use, but only fifteen federally funded studies of
adolescents and driving. 33 5 The quantity of published research on
teen driving in general pales in comparison with that on other
adolescent health issues. Thus from 1985 to 2009, a search found
12,888 references for articles addressing teen smoking, compared
to 1,601 references for articles addressing teen driving. 336 In light
of the significant health burden imposed by motor vehicle crashes
involving teen drivers, this academic and political inattention
must be overcome. To do so requires concerted efforts to publicize
the findings of traffic safety research, educate the public on the
nature of the young driver problem, and advocate for reform at the
state and federal legislative levels. A number of independent
organizations (including, for example, the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety) and state legislatures have made meaningful
strides, but significant reductions in crashes and fatalities will not
occur without widespread reform.
Legislators and academics both frequently express the view
that increasing the age of licensure is not a politically feasible

334See Laird, supra note 40, at 314 ("Longitudinal studies of adolescent development
routinely track high-risk behaviors such as sexual promiscuity and drug use yet rarely
consider driving behaviors even though driving is directly responsible for more teenage
deaths."); Shope & Bingham, supra note 7, at S261 (complaining that the "safety of teenage
drivers has too often been neglected in books and publications on adolescent health").
335Blachman & Abrams, supra note 1, at S285.
336 SUBCOMM. ON YOUNG DRIVERS, supra note 175, at 5.
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option. 337 It is undoubtedly true that "[I]egislative change requires
continuous effort, especially when safety has to compete with
custom and convenience, as it so often does." 338 However, studies
suggest that skeptics may overestimate the level of public
resistance, and that such resistance may be more readily overcome
than many believe.3 3 9 Surveys of parents consistently find
significant support for raising the licensing age, and overwhelming
majorities have supported increasing various restrictions on young
drivers, such as mandatory learner's phases. Importantly, in
states where restrictions have been put into place, parents report
near-universal support of them.
One study found that one in five parents reported that safety
concerns had led them to attempt (usually unsuccessfully) to delay
their children obtaining a learner's permit. 340 Another study
surveying parents of graduating seniors in several Eastern states
found that a significant majority supported minimum licensing
ages of seventeen to eighteen or older in Connecticut (60%) and
New York (61%).3 41 In New Jersey, where the minimum licensing
age was already seventeen, 92% supported the higher licensing
ages (with 65% endorsing age seventeen and 25% endorsing ages
eighteen or older). 342 Only in Delaware, an historically "easylicensing" state, did a minority of parents (but a significant
minority-37%) endorse licensing ages of seventeen or older.3 43
In a study of Connecticut and Florida parents' opinions on
newly enacted legislation in those states, around 90% supported
mandatory supervised learner's periods and nighttime curfews. 344
In Connecticut, 82% of parents favored a nighttime curfew-even

331See, e.g., Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 19 (lamenting that "political and social
pressures" have prevented raising the licensing age to eighteen or nineteen (citing A.F.
Williams, Laws and Regulations Applicable to Teenagers or New Drivers: Their Potential for
Reducing Motor Vehicle Injuries, in YOUNG DRIVER ACCIDENTS-IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS

43 (D.R. Mayhew et al. eds., 1983))).
338 Keating & Halpern-Felsher, supra note 156, at S272.
339 See Williams & Mayhew, supra note 69, at S325 ("[R]aising the minimum licensing age
has never been seriously considered, even though it is widely supported in surveys of
parents.").
340 Scott-Parker et al., supranote 149, at 470.
341 William et al., supra note 111, at 5 tbl.4.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 5.
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though the legislature had removed the curfew provision from the
enacted statute. 345 Even those parents who anticipated that the
new laws would inconvenience them and their children strongly
favored the new legislation. 346 In Michigan, where legislation
imposing supervised practice requirement passed only narrowly
(and after other restrictions were removed from the proposed bill),
the average number of hours of supervised practice reported by
parents "was far more than that required, and parents described
how the experience brought home to them how much the young
driver needed even more practice. Most indicated that they would
continue to place restrictions on their young driver, even after the
347
state allowed unsupervised driving."
Without question, delaying adolescent licensure will sacrifice
some mobility and convenience. At the same time, research has
demonstrated that in New Jersey, the only state with a licensing
age above sixteen, "licensure at age 17 has little effect on the
lifestyle or employment of New Jersey 16 year-olds while
348
producing a substantial reduction in their crash involvement.
Where exactly to strike the balance between safety and mobility is
a social policy decision, and ideally requires additional empirical
study of the necessity of adolescent mobility.
2. State Police Power, Federal Spending Power. The issuance,
regulation, and revocation of driver's licenses all fall squarely
within states' police power to legislate to advance the public
welfare and protect the safety of its citizens.
Despite the
importance to individuals of the ability to drive, courts have held
that "[t]he right to operate a motor vehicle is wholly a creation of
state law; it certainly is not explicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution, and nothing in that document ... has even the
349
slightest appearance of an implicit guarantee of that right."
345 Id.
346 Id.

347 Waller, supra note 96, at 20-21 (citing Patricia F. Waller et al., ParentalViews of and
Experience with Michigan's GraduatedLicensing Program, 31 J. SAFETY RES. 9 (2000)). A
proposed passenger restriction failed to pass, and nighttime restriction was shortened to
restrict nighttime driving only from midnight to five a.m. Id. at 22.
348 Susan A. Ferguson et al., Differences in Young Driver Crash Involvement in States with
Varying Licensure Practices, 28 AcCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 171, 180 (1996)
(citations omitted).
349 Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977); see also Berberian v. Lussier, 139
A.2d 869, 872 (R.I. 1958) ("[T]he right to use the public highways for travel by motor
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Driving is thus subject to state-imposed conditions that must
satisfy
only
minimal
constitutional
requirements
of
35
0
reasonableness.
So long as regulations satisfy minimum
constitutional requirements, courts will not second-guess
35 1
legislatures' policy decisions.
The public has generally accepted, and courts have almost
universally upheld, licensing requirements and other motorvehicle regulations as valid exercises of states' police power to
promote public safety and welfare. 352 Age-based restrictions have
been no exception, and courts have sustained them against both
state and federal constitutional challenges. 353 In a 1930 decision
upholding a statute in the face of one such challenge, the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that the state need only
demonstrate that the "classification is reasonable." 354
It
acknowledged that a minimum-age requirement might very well
deny an otherwise-competent person younger than the set
minimum age the right to drive, but noted that nonetheless, "[t]he
line must be drawn somewhere," and that although some persons
below the set age requirement might be better drivers even than
some adults, "the fact remains that, as a class, they have not, at
that age, attained the discretion and judgment which would make
'355
it safe for them to operate motor vehicles upon the highway.

vehicles is one which properly can be regulated by the legislature in the valid exercise of the
police power of the state.").
350 See Sedlacek v. Ahrens, 530 P.2d 424, 426 (Mont. 1974) (holding that the state has the
power to suspend or revoke a license if the licensee fails to comply with certain conditions);
Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1953) (same).
351 See, e.g., Trautmann ex rel. Trautmann v. Christie, 15 A.3d 22, 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2011), affd, 48 A.3d 1005 (N.J. 2012) ("We decline to discuss plaintiffs' policy
arguments. The wisdom of [the state law requiring those under twenty-one to display
decals on the outside of cars while driving] is a question for the Legislature not the
courts.").
352 Mayhew et al., supra note 53, at 4 (quoting R.L. Donigan & E.C. Fisher, Driver
Licensing and the Law, 13 TRAFFIc DIG. & REV. 20, 21 (1965)).
353 See, e.g., State ex rel. Oleson v. Graunke, 229 N.W. 329, 330 (Neb. 1930) (holding that
the state's "limit of 16 years is not arbitrary but is a reasonable exercise of the police power,
and... is not violative of either the state or Federal constitutions, which forbid the taking
of private property without due process").
354 Id.
355 Id.; see also Charbonneau v. MacRury, 153 A. 457, 463-64 (N.H. 1931) (admitting that
the state's minimum age provision "arbitrarily" denies persons under sixteen the right to
drive, but noting that "[tihe necessities of society . . . require that some age should be
considered as prima facie evidence of maturity"); Schultz v. Morrison, 91 Misc. 248, 250
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States may thus impose conditions on licensure that aim to
ensure the competence of all drivers, and revoke licensure when
drivers commit certain offenses. States' authority to regulate
licensure goes further, however, and they may revoke drivers'
licenses even for non-driving offenses. Courts have upheld, for
example, state statutes that revoke licensure for nonpayment of
taxes, marijuana possession, automobile theft, and resisting
arrest.

356

The federal government, on the other hand, lacks the power to
regulate traffic safety or licensure. That is not to say that the
federal government lacks influence over highway and traffic safety
measures. To the contrary, Congress has made effective use of its
spending power, 357 conditioning federal monies on state adoption of
desirable legislation.
For example, twenty-one became the
drinking age only after Congress enacted the National Minimum
Drinking Age Act, which reduced the amount of federal highway
funds given to states that failed to raise their minimum legal
3 58
drinking ages to twenty-one.
Congress continues to use its spending power to encourage the
states to enact legislation aimed at improving traffic safetyincluding legislation targeting young drivers.
In 2012, for
example, Congress passed the Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century Act, which included amendments to the Highway

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1915), affd, 156 N.Y.S. 1144 (N.Y. App. Div.) (observing that a New York
statute prohibiting unsupervised driving by persons under eighteen has, by doing so,
"declare[d] that such persons do not possess the requisite care and judgment to run motor
vehicles on the public highways without endangering the lives and limbs of others").
356 See State v. Smith, 276 A.2d 369, 375 (N.J. 1971) (upholding statute allowing
revocation as punishment for narcotics use); Appeal of Deems, 395 A.2d 616, 617 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978) (upholding statute allowing revocation after conviction for selling
vehicles with defaced serial numbers); Bieling v. Malloy, 346 A.2d 204, 207 (Vt. 1975)
(upholding statute allowing revocation for nonpayment of poll taxes); Michael S. Vaughn et
al., A Legislative and Constitutional Examination of "Abuse and Lose" Juvenile Driving
Statutes, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 411, 422 (1992) (citing a Florida decision upholding a statute
allowing revocation for resisting arrest).
357 "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
358 Pub. L. No. 98-363, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 435, 437-39 (1984) (codified as amended at 23
U.S.C. § 158 (2012)). The Supreme Court upheld the Act in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 212 (1987).
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Safety Act. 359 To encourage states to "improve traffic safety for
teen drivers," its provisions would fund state efforts to increase
seatbelt use, reduce speeding, reduce "impaired and distracted
driving," and "reduce other behaviors by teen drivers that lead to
360
injuries and fatalities."
3. Adolescents' and Parents' Legal Rights. Although licensure
and the mobility and autonomy that accompany it are undoubtedly
of real importance to adolescents, it is quite inconceivable that
courts would reverse a century-old course and consider driver's
licensure-let alone adolescent licensure-a right entitled to any
sort of heightened constitutional protection. Courts have instead
uniformly rejected such arguments. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island, for example, found the issue an easy one to decide, stating
that when the claimed right is the "right to operate a motor vehicle
on the public highways .... we have no hesitation in holding that
this is not a fundamental right."361 Litigants have also argued
unsuccessfully that the right to drive is necessary to secure
another fundamental right-the right to interstate travel. The
same Rhode Island court dismissed the argument as "utterly
3 62
frivolous."
Even if licensure fails to rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected right, state classifications that draw distinctions
between classes of individuals must comport with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, under which classifications drawn along certain lines are
inherently suspect-namely those based on race, national origin,
or alienage. 363 The Supreme Court has held, however, that
statutory distinctions based on age are not suspect and, unless
they infringe a fundamental right, will be subjected only to the

319 Pub. L. No. 112-141, sec. 31102(g), § 402(m), 126 Stat. 405, 738 (2012) (codified at 23
U.S.C. § 402 (2012) (originally enacted as Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564,
ch. 4, § 402, 80 Stat. 731, 731-33)).
360 23 U.S.C. § 402(m) (2012).
361 Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791, 794 (R.I. 1977).
362

Id.

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
363

81, 100 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Oyama v. California,

332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
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most deferential standard of review. 364 Age-based classifications
thus survive "if the legislature could have reasonably concluded
that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state
purpose." 365 As noted above, courts have upheld minimum age
requirements against equal protection challenges:
[T]he state has a legitimate interest in preventing the
operation of motor vehicles by those unable to exercise
mature judgment[;] ...individualized testing for
maturity in this context is a practical impossibility[,]
and ...in the interest of highway safety a line had to
be drawn somewhere.
Such a line is necessarily
inexact; it may well exclude some qualified
individuals. Where rationality is the test, however, "a
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are
366
imperfect."
The research reported above merely extends both the commonsense observations of early-twentieth-century legislators and the
grounded conclusions of Congress (expressed in current and earlier
versions of the Federal Highway Safety Act) of the heightened
risks posed by teen drivers. Informed by additional insights from
this research, legislation imposing additional age-based
restrictions on young drivers would almost surely survive this
most deferential standard.
While parents have the presumptive right to direct the
upbringing of their children, and some parents would undoubtedly
prefer that their children acquire licensure earlier rather than
later or object to certain restrictions imposed on young drivers, the
state's countervailing interest in the public welfare and its child
citizens gives it expansive regulatory rights. 367 Thus, the Supreme

34 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (holding that a statute
requiring uniformed state police officers to retire at age fifty did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
365Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983).
36 Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d at 795 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970)).
367 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (invalidating state legislation
restricting the teaching of foreign languages in elementary schools, but acknowledging
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Court has upheld all manner of regulations that otherwise
interfere with parental rights, such as a broad ability to regulate
children's education. Conversely, parents wishing to delay their
children acquiring licensure beyond a state-imposed minimum age
would likely (as they currently do) be given that right, at least
until their child reaches the age of majority.
Regulations' effects on both the young and their parents
recently converged in Trautmann v. Christie, in which parents
challenged on behalf of their teen children a New Jersey law
requiring drivers under twenty-one to display a decal on the car
identifying them as young drivers subject to various restrictions. 368
The law aimed to increase young driver compliance with and
facilitate police enforcement of these restrictions, which include
limits on nighttime driving and carrying passengers. 369 The
parents argued that the law was preempted by a federal statute
protecting drivers' privacy rights, violated equal protection rights
guaranteed by both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions,
and would lead to unconstitutional searches and seizures. 3 70 The
attorney who brought and argued the case before the court, the
father of a teenaged girl, expressed concern that the decals would
increase the likelihood of teens being profiled by police or targeted
by sexual predators. 371 Other New Jersey parents shared his
concern and thus resisted the regulation on the grounds that they,
better than the state, could determine how best to protect their
"[tihat the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens, physically, mentally and morally").
368 Trautmann ex rel. Trautmann v. Christie, 48 A.3d 1005, 1007 (N.J. 2012) (per curiam)
(upholding N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:3-13.2a, 39:3-13, 39:3-13.4f, as amended by L. 2009, c. 37
["Ch. 37"]).
369 N.J. TEEN DRIVER STUDY COMM'N, TEEN DRIVER STUDY COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION
REPORT 1 (2008).
370 Trautmann, 48 A.3d at 1007-08.
Plaintiffs argued first that the Federal Driver's
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, preempted Ch. 37, because the federal
statute prohibits states from disclosing drivers' "personal information." Id. at 1007.
Second, they argued that Ch. 37 treated young N.J. drivers differently from young drivers
licensed in other states who were permitted to drive in New Jersey, thus violating the equal
protections clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 1007; see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1. Finally, they argued that, by permitting police
to identify their age group, Ch. 37 constituted an "unreasonable search," also in violation of
the federal and state constitutions. Trautmann, 48 A.3d at 1008; see U.S. CONST. amend.
IV,XIV; N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7.
371 Kate Zernike, Youth Driving Laws Limit Even the Double Date, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2012. at Al.
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children.372 The headline of a New York Times article reporting
the New Jersey decision and other restrictions on teen driving
illustrated the stakes for young citizens themselves, announcing
with what can only be described as empathetic dismay that the
state's Youth Driving Laws Limit Even the Double Date.37 3

In

August 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
37 4
challenge and upheld the statue.
As discussed in Part IV.A above, policymakers considering
measures whose effect would constrict the liberties of a category of
individuals should consider more than whether their legislative
efforts would survive constitutional scrutiny.
Licensure
restrictions implicate liberties important to individuals, even if
they do not merit fundamental constitutional protection. Failure
to give them full consideration contravenes the nation's historical
commitment (in theory, if not always in practice) to the
foundational norm of individual liberty. Yet even the most
committed liberal generally agrees that liberties that individuals
are themselves entitled to exercise include those which they are
capable of exercising. Especially in contexts where individual
decisionmaking is not purely self-regarding-where others will
bear the negative externalities of incompetently made decisionsthe state is not only justified, but obligated, to withhold or delay
the unfettered right to exercise a certain liberty.
V. CONCLUSION
The immature regulatory competence of adolescents confounds
the execution of their still-nascent driving skills in real-world
372

See generally McCartt et al., supra note 307.

373 Zernike, supra note 371.
374 Trautmann, 48 A.3d at 1007.

Affirming and adopting the legal reasoning of the
Appellate Division, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that (1) the N.J. statute neither
contravened nor was preempted by the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act, since
displaying the decals did not constitute disclosure of the sort of "highly restricted personal
information" protected by the Act; (2) the statute was rationally related to the legitimate
interest of the New Jersey licensing system, which governs only drivers licensed by the
state, and thus violates neither the state nor federal equal protection clauses; and (3) while
a decal affixed to the exterior of a car might be plainly observable by law enforcement, such
observation, without more, does not constitute a search. Any detention of a car bearing a
decal by a law enforcement officer, moreover, must comport with the same constitutional
requirements governing stops of other vehicles. Id. at 1007-09.
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contexts. For all beginners, the acquisition of driving skill comes
only with guided practice and experience over many months.
Guided practice is essential to expertise development. But only
increased maturity and the development that comes with it can
lead to the reliable exhibition of regulatory competence. Thus,
licensure reform should provide for an extended supervised
learning period, which should safely begin in mid-adolescence
(ages fourteen to sixteen). Unsupervised licensure should be
delayed until young people have gained the expertise that comes
with practice and experience, and the regulatory competence that
comes with age and development. This requires raising the age of
licensure, ideally to eighteen.

